Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1948

Dwight L. King v. The Denver and Rio Grande
Western Railroad Company : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall and McCarthy; Attorneys for Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, King v. Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., No. 7221 (Utah Supreme Court, 1948).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/953

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

7221.

In the

S.eme Com1 of the State of Utah
IPWIGHT L. KING, Administrator of
'the Estate of GERALD DALLAS
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7221

v.
THE DENVER ANU RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY,
corporation,

a

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

LED
1AEP iD1948

VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL AND McCARTHY,

l•

Attorneys for Appel(ant.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- - - - - - - - p R O W PUSI, IALT LAKE

INDEX
Page
STATEMENT OF F.A:CTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Evidence re alleged violation of the Safety
Appliance Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

Evidence re alleged absence of bumper device
and hazardous construction of the bin .

17

....

19

...........................

21

THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY VIOLATION OF THE SAFETY APPLIANCE .A!CT
.A:ND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING SUCH ISS'UE AND IN REFUSING
TO WITHDRAW IT FROM CONSIDER:ATION
OF THE JURY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

21

· STATEMENT OF ERRORS

ARGUMENT.

. I.

1

THERE WAS INSUFF:rCIENT EVIDE'NCE
TO JUSTIFY SUBMISSION TO THE JURY
OF THE ISSUES OF ALLEGED ABSENCE
OF A BUMPER DEVICE AND ALLEGED
HAZARDOUS CONSTRUCTION OF T HE
1

BIN........................................

32

Ill. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY GAVE
TO THE JURY A SERIES OF REPETITIOUS
INSTRUCTIONS WITH RE8PEGT TO T:HE
SAFE:TY APPDIANCE ACT, WHICH UNDULY EMPHASIZED PLAINTIFF'S THEORY
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX-Continued
Page

OF THE CASE AND UNBALANCED THE ENTIRE CHARGE TO THE PREJUDICE OF
THE DEFENDANT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

36

IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 7 AND 8, BY GIVING THE
JURY A ROVING COMMISSION TO FIND
DE:FENJ)ANT GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE
WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE PARTICULAR ACTS OF NEGLIGENCE GHA.RGED IN
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT OR ESTABLISHED BY THE EVIDE"NGE . . . . . . . . .
. . 42
V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT BOTH
DEFENDANT AND THE DECEDENT WERE
ENGAGED IN INT"ERSTATE COMMERCE,
AND TH·ERE·FORE THAT PLAINTIFF WAS
ENTI~LED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE
REMEDY AFFORDED BY THE FEDERAL
EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT' ..............

50

VI. DE FENDlNNT'S. RIGHT TO SET - OFF
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT, IF ANY, IS
E·XPRESSLY AUT'HORIZED BY STATUTE . . . 57
1

VII. THE VERUICT IS EXCEISSIVE AN'D THE
TRIAL OOURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN REFUSING 'TO ORDER A REDUCTION IN'
THE AMOUNT OR A NEW TRIAL . . . . . .

65

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX-Continued
Page
STATUTES CITED

Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U. S. C. A.,
Sec. 51, 55, 58 ........................ 38, 40, 62, 64
Safety Appliance Act, 45 U. S. C. A.,
Sec. 11 . . .
. ............... 19, 22, 40, 42, 52, 53
CASES CITED

Allison v. McCarthy, 106 Utah 278, 147 P. (2d)
870, 873 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

71

Avance v. Thompson, 387 Ill. 77, 55 N. E. (2d) 57,
cert. denied 323 U. S. 753, 65 S. Ct. 82 . . . . . . . . . .

54

Belnap v. Widdison, 32 Utah 246, 90 Pac. 393 ·. . . . . . . .

48

Carruthers v. Atlantic & Y. Ry. Co., 2'15 N. C. 675,
2 S. E. (2d) 878, 879 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

41

Casey v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 60 Mont. 56, 198
Pac. 141 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

69

Chatelain v. Thackeray, 9'8 Utah 52,5, 100 P. (2d)
191, 198 . . . . . . . . . . .
...................

71

Chicago Great Western Ry. Co. v. Peeler, 140 F.
(2d) 865 (C. C. A. 8) ........................ 62, 64
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Coogan, 271 U.S. 472,
46 8. Ct. 564, 566 ........................... 28, 30
City of Lake Forest v. Janowitz, 295 Ill. App. 289,
14 N. E. (2d) 894, 896 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

41

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX-Continued
Page
Didinger v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 39 F.
('2d) 798, 79.9 ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' .. ' ' .. ' ' ' ' '

23

Fantroy v. Schirmer (App. Mo.) 296 S. W. 2:3,5, 238 . . .

41

Fowkes v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 46 Utah
502, 151 Pac. 53 . . . . . . . . . . . . .
..........

32

Fowler v. Medical Arts Bldg.,
(2d) 711 '

Utah ... , 188 P.
'' ''''.' '''' '.'' ''

37

Fowler v. Pleasant Valley Coal Co., 16 Utah 348, 52
Pac. 594 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

69

Geary v. Cain, 69 Utah 340, 255 Pac. 416, 418 . . . . . .

72

Grand Trunk Western R. Co. v. Holstein, 67 F. (2d)
780 (C. C. A. 6) . . .
....................

31

Grifenhan v. Chicago Railways Company, 2'99 Ill. 590,
13f.2 N. E. 790 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

46

Herring v. Chicago and A. R. Co., 299 Ill. 214, 132
N. E. 792 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

45

Hetrick v. Reading Co., 39 F. Supp. 22 (Dist. Ct.,
N. J.)
.............
. ...... 60, 61, 62, 64
Roll v. Southern Pac. Co., 71 F. Supp. 21, 23 . . . . . . . .

55

Industrial Comm. v. Wasatch Grading Co., 80 Utah
223, 14 P. (2d) 988 ......................... 32, 47
Jensen v. Denver & E. G. R. Co., 44 Utah 100, 138
Pac. 1185, 1192 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

72

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX-Continued
Page
Jensen v. Utah Ry. Co., 72 Utah 366, 270 Pac. 349,
358 ....................................... 39,49
Kendall v. Fordham, 79 Utah 256, 9 P. (2d) 183

32

Looney v. Metropolitan Railroad Co., 200 U. S. 480,
488, 26 S. Ct. 303 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31

McCarthy v. Palmer, et al., 113 F. (2d) 72.1
(C.C.A. 2) ................................. 5H, 60
Miller v. Southern Pac. Co., 82 Utah 46, 21 P. (2d)
865, 879
...............................

71

Myers v. Reading Company, 331 U. S. 477, 67 S. Ct.
1334 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23, 3·5, 38
O'Hara v. Central Illinois Light Co., 319 Ill. App.
336, 49 N. E. (2d) 27 4, 278 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

41

Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Chamberlain, 2.88 U. S. 313-3,
53 S. Ct. 391 ............................ 28, 31, 34
Peterson v. Sorensen, 91 Utah 507, 6·5 P. (2d) 12 ... 32, 36
Risinger v. Sullivan (App. Tex.) 161 S. W. 397 . . . . . .

41

Schilling v. Delaware & H. R. Corporation, 114 F.
(2d) 69, 72, (C.C.A. 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

32

Stephens Ranch & Live Stock Co. v. Union Pac. R.
Co, 48 Utah 528, 161 Pac. 459, 462 .

.

72

Texas and Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33,
36 S. Ct. 482 ............................... .

53

1 • •

•

.

.

•

•

.

.

.

.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
DWIGHT L. KING, Administrator of
the Estate of GERALD DALLAS
THOMAS, deceased,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

Case No.
7221

THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF F.AJCTS
This appeal is from a verdict and judgment in favor of
the plaintiff below in the amount of $50,000, on account of
the death of Gerald Dallas Thomas, an employee of The
Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, which
occurred at Sunnyside, Utah, on October 11, 1947. * On
*Throughout this brief, the parties will be referred to as in the
trial court. All italics are supplied.
.
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November 5, 1947, Dwight L. King, a lawyer in the office
of the attorneys who prosecuted this action, was appointed
Administrator of the Estate of the deceased and commenced
this action as party plaintiff (R. 1, 2~5). Summons was
served on defendant on November 10, 1947 (R. 10).

:fit

~~ l

:trau
·Ji,

:{r:

:eooa

The railroad tracks, coal bin, and other physical features incident to the case are fully illustrated by plaintiff's
Exhibit A, a scale map of a portion of the yards at Sunnyside,
Utah, prepared by a civil engineer in defendant's engineering department, which map was adopted and introduced by
the plaintiff during the trial as his own exhibit (R. 116,
350) ; also by plaintiff's Exhibits C toR, inclusive, which are
photographs of sections of the railroad tracks involved and
views of the coal bin taken after the accident (R. 32). The
views of the bin were introduced in evidence over defendant's
objection (R. 125-127).
Sunnyside is located in rather a wide canyon running
generally in a north to south direction. Two parallel sets
of track, known as the main line track and the load track
run up and down the canyon, in addition to connecting storage and switch tracks (R. 156-158). At the upper end of
the canyon near the Town of Sunnyside is located a tipple
where coal is loaded into railroad cars. Some two thousand
feet south of the coal tipple, a switch track known as the
"bin track" branches off from the load track and runs in a
southeasterly direction along the canyon hillside for about
3,000 feet (R. 11, 131-133). At the southern end of the
bin track is a large box-like coal bin owned by the Utah
Fuel Company and used for the storage of slack coal. The

.!ii1e

:liE
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slack coal is used for fuel in the nearby coke ovens of the
Utah Fuel Company (R. 290). The Utah F'uel Company
operates small electric "larry" cars to carry to coal from the
bin to the ovens ( R. 29~29'1) . The larry cars, similar to
small railroad cars, run on a narrow gauge track underneath
the coal bin structure and between the bin and the coke
ovens (R. 123-124). Standard gauge railroad track runs
along the top of the bin structure as a continuation of the
bin track. As shown by Exhibit A, the bin track approaches
the bin over a wood trestle 43.6 feet long. The bin itself is
198 feet in length (R. 123). At the south end of the bin
and bin track, a bumper device was installed prior to the
accident. The railroad tracks curved upward and inward to
a point on the bumper ( R. 135) .
The accident to Thomas occurred when two loaded cars
of coal were being "dropped" from a position on the load
track just north of and above the switch leading to the bin
track, through the switch and onto the bin track and along
the bin track out to the coal bin (R. 16,S.. l70; R. 290-297).
Thomas, the head brakeman of the train crew, mounted the
brake platform of the lead or most southerly of the two cars.
In "dropping" these two cars to the bin, it was Thomas' job
to regulate and control their speed by means of the Ajax
brake on the car he was riding and to bring the cars to a
stop when the cars had reached the desired spot on the bin
(R. 149, 178). The total distance to be traveled by the cars
from their position north of the bin track switch to their
intended position on top of the coal bin was more than onehalf mile (R. 122-12'3,). The grade of the bin track for about
the first 300 feet after entering the bin track was 3.5%,
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then for about the next 500 feet the grade tapered off from
3.5% to 0.5o/o, and for the remaining 2200 feet to the coal
bin the grade was approximately level (R. 118...:122, Exhibit
A). The grade enabled cars to roll from their position on
the load track into the bin track and out to the coal bin by
force of gravity (R. 149-150). Although the grade of the
bin track slackened appreciably after the first 700 to 800
feet, application and regulation of a brake on loaded cars
was necessary to bring the cars to a stop on the bin (R. 151,
178).
The two cars were ridden towards the bin by Thomas
as planned, but instead of being stopped on the bin as intended, the cars continued on over the south end of the bin
structure and fell 34 feet to the ground below (R. 170-171,
299). Afterwards, Thomas was found in the wreckage of
the cars at the base of the bin. He was unconscious and had
sustained fatal injuries. He died a few hours later in the
hospital at Dragerton, Utah, without regaining consciousness (R. 170).
The complaint filed by the plaintiff in this case alleged
that the defendant was responsible for the death of Thomas
by reason of its negligence in each of the following particulars (R. 4-5) :
(a) That defendant used and adopted a dangerous
and unsafe method to place cars on the coal bin, in that,
instead of using a locomotive to control the speed of cars
as they were moved onto the bin, the cars were placed in
motion and Thomas was required to control their speed and
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momentum by means of the hand brake which was insufficient for that purpose.
(b) That defendant violated the Safety Appliance Act
in using and hauling on its tracks a car not equipped with
a sufficient hand brake, to wit, the hand brake on the lead
car of the two cars loaded with coal ; that as a result of the
insufficiency of the hand brake, it was impossible for
Thomas by use of said brake in the usual, ordinary and
proper manner to control the speed of the cars or to bring
them to a stop on the bin.
(c) That defendant failed to provide Thomas with a
safe place to work, in that, he was required to ride the cars
loaded with coal in reliance upon the hand brake of the leading car to control the cars and bring them to a stop on the
coal bin, without making the coal bin safe for an eventuality
such as occurred, in that no bumper timbers or bumper devices were placed at the end of the bin for the purpose of
stopping cars whose speed or momentum had not been
otherwise controlled.
(d) That defendant negligently planned its work incident to the moving of the two cars loaded with coal onto
the bin, and negligently built and constructed the bin so as to
cause a hazardous situation to exist.
Each and all of the foregoing counts of negligence were
denied by the defendant, and by way of affirmative defense
the defendant alleged the contributory negligence of the
decedent as a proximate cause of the accident (R. 12).
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Before trial, the defendant also filed an amended answer, consisting of a set-off and counterclaim (R. 16·18).
In this pleading, the defendant asked that the sum of
$4,923.98 be set off against any judgment the plaintiff
might be awarded in this action. It was alleged that such
set-off was due because of sums contributed by the defendant to the Treasury of the United States for the benefit
of the deceased, and which now were due and payable to
the widow and minor children of the deceased on account of
the injury and death for which plaintiffs action was brought.
The plaintiff filed a demurrer (R. 19) and a motion to strike
(R. 20) the foregoing set-off. On February 17, 1948, after
hearing and argument, the trial court granted the plaintiff's demurrer and sustained the motion to strike (R. 24).
Trial of the case was commenced on February 18, 1947
before the Honorable Ray VanCott, Jr. and consumed three
days. Evidence was introduced by both sides. At the close
of the defendant's case, a motion for a directed verdict was
submitted to the court by the defendant (R. 3'52-354). The
motion was denied ( R. 354) . The case was then submitted
to the jury, under instructions by the court, and a verdict
was returned in favor of the plaintiff for $50,000. No diminution was made from the verdict by reason of any contributory negligence on the part of the deceased (R. 33B).
1

Since error is predicated in this appeal upon the insufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict based on at
least three of the counts of negligence charged against the
defendant and submitted to the jury, the relevant evidence with respect to these particular issues is set forth
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in considerable detail as part of the statement of facts in
this case:

Evidence re alleged viola.tion of the Safety· Appliance
Act.
The plaintiff called only two witnesses who knew anything at all concerning the events conected with the accident. The first of these witnesses was Ernest E. Barnes,
conductor of the train crew, the other witness was John T.
Schauster, rear brakeman of the same crew.

Barnes testified as follows:
He had worked at Sunnyside as a conductor and as a
brakeman for short periods at various times from 19'3;6 up
to the date of the accident (R. 142). He had been working
there for about five days just prior to the accident to Thomas
(R. 190). During the periods that Barnes had worked at
Sunnyside, no particular custom or method was used by
switching crews in taking loads of coal from the load track
onto the bin track and spotting them on the coal bin (R. 146).
On occasions, the loaded cars would be dropped and spotted
by gravity directly from the load track to the bin (R. 146).
In so doing, the movement usually was started above the
bin track. A brakeman would release the hand brakes and
ride the cars to the bin. The cars were controlled by means
of the hand brakes (R. 149). When cars were dropped, the
speed usually would be attained during the first 500 or 600
feet due to the heavier grade on that portion of the bin track
(R. 149-150), thereafter the grade of the track was comparatively level all the way to the bin (R. 150).
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On the morning of October 11, shortly before the accident, the switch engine had been derailed. Barnes told
Schauster and Thomas, the two brakemen, that the two
loaded coal cars would be dropped out to the bin. Thomas
got on the brake platform of the first of the two cars, that
is, the lead car or the one furtherest down hill (R. 168). The
brake on this car was an Ajax brake, which is a power brake.
It is a very good brake. You don't have to use a brake club
on it; it is strictly a hand brake (R. 168). The cars were
standing with their brakes set. The brakes were holding
properly (R. 180). At the point where the cars were then
standing, there was a fairly steep grade. Barnes observed
that the brakes on the two cars going to the bin were operative and holding the loaded cars on the grade. After
Thomas. got on the brake platform at the front end of the
lead car, Schauster got on the second car. Schauster released
the brake on his car first. The two bin track cars then were
disengaged from the other cars in the cut. The two cars
then were being held on the grade merely by the one brake
on the end of the lead car that Thomas was riding (R. 181).
This one brake properly was holding the t~o cars on the
3% grade (R. 18'1). Thomas then released the brake and
the two cars started to roll toward the bin track (R. 182).
After Thomas had started down the bin track with the
two cars, Schauster and Barnes proceeded to drop the two
remaining cars of the cut down toward the storage track.
As Barnes was riding the remaining cars into the storage
track, he saw the two cars on the bin track from 400 to 600
feet from the bin (R. 168..169). When Barnes saw the cars,
he remarked to Schauster, "I believe they are going too fast"
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(R. 169). When this comment was made, it was Barnes' observation that there was something unusual about the movement of the cars (R. 177). Barnes was apprehensive so he
continued to watch (R. 180). At the one half mile distance
he was from the cars on the bin track, Barnes would "guess"
the cars were going anywhere from 8 to 10 miles per hour
(R. 169, 193). His statement concerning the speed of the
cars was purely an estimate. It is possible the cars
were moving faster than 8 to 10 miles per hour. It was a
dark and gloomy day (R. 175). Barnes could not state how
fast the cars were moving as they moved across the wood
trestle on the approach to this bin. The cars had to be moving past an object before Barnes could tell whether the cars
were moving, and he must have been 60 car lengths distant
from the bin track (R. 170). Later on redirect examination,
Barnes said that when the cars approached the bin they
possibly were not moving over 5 or 6 miles per hour ( R.
193). Barnes didn't "imagine" the cars were going over 4
miles per hour when they got onto the bin and were passing
the sign on the bin (located 50 feet from the end of the bin
as shown by Exhibit A) (R. 194). At that speed, in Barnes'
opinion, the cars could have been stopped "most any time,
within a couple of car lengths" (R. 194). Barnes kept
watching the cars. He could see the cars were still moving
at a slow rate of speed. He saw the cars hit the incline or
bumper device at the end of the bin, and the lead end of the
car raised up very slowly (R. 169). It seemed like this incline broke away and the cars pitched right off the bin into
the ground. At no time during the period that Barnes
watched the cars move could he see Thomas (R. 170). He
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didn't know whether or not Thomas ever applied the brakes
(R. 175).

Schauster testified as follows:
In the regular course of his duties on October 11th,
Schauster knew that either he or Thomas was going to ride
the cars to the bin. Nobody specifically told them to do
this; it was just part of their ordinary duties. They took it
as a matter of course (R. 2·52). When he and Thomas
walked toward the two cars, Schauster said to Thomas,
"Jerry, get the pin and release the hand brake. I will ride
these cars to the bin" ( R. 243) . Thomas replied, "No, I
will drop them; you get the pin" (R. 243). Thomas then
stepped up to the brake platform of the lead car and Schauster went to the rear of the two cars. Schauster pulled the pin
between the two bin cars and the other two cars of the cut,
and then got up on the platform of the end }?rake of the
second car (R. 244) . Schauster released the brake on his
end of the second bin car. The two cars continued to stand
on the grade held by the one brake applied on Thomas' end
of the lead car. At that time, the brake on the front end of
the lead car was functioning properly (R. 254). Thomas
gave Schauster a signal that he was ready to move and
Barnes also gave a signal. The cars were still standing
there as Schauster proceeded to get down from the car he
had been on. Thomas then released the brake on the end
of the car he was riding, and the cars started to move into
the bin track ( R. 244) .
Schauster and Barnes next took the two remaining cars
down to the storage track ( R. 244) . As they were dropping
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these two cars, Barnes remarked to Schauster, "I believe
he is going a little fast" (R. 245). When Schauster looked
in the direction of the bin track, he saw the two cars approaching the bin. The cars were four or five car lengths
north of the bin (R. 245). At that time, Schauster would
estimate the speed of the cars at 7 or 8 miles per hour (R.
246, 2'5:5). When Schauster previously had discussed th~
matter with defendant's counsel, he had estimated the speed
at this particular point at 8 to 10 miles per hour, perhaps
faster.' But he didn't know exactly the speed (R. 257-258).
He merely estimated the approximate speed from his position one-half mile away from the cars (R. 250). Schauster
continued to watch the cars. They appeared to be slowing
as they went by a stationary white sign located at the approach to the trestle of the bin. At that point, Schauster
would estimate the speed of the cars at 3 to 4 or possibly
5 miles per hour. The cars moved past a second sign which
read "Cars Must Not Pass This Point," and went on over
the end of the bin (R. 246). Schauster could not see Thomas
on the cars. He didn't know what, if anything, Thomas did
about the brakes (R. 258).
After the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, the defendant called three witnesses. The first two of these witnesses,
Silas A. Ross, Jr. and Arnett W. Dodds, were employees
of the Utah Fuel Co. Both of these men saw the cars moving
down the bin track and made observations regarding the
speed of the cars and of other details incident to the movements of Thomas on the cars. Both witnesses were much
closer to the moving cars than either Barnes or Schauster.
Defendant's third witness, a General Car Foreman by the
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name of Alfred ,George Martin, made a detailed inspection
of the cars, car brakes and tracks involved shortly after
the accident.
Ross testified as follows:

Ross worked as a chemist at the coke ovens (R. 2~88).
He was an eye witness to the occurrences leading to the
accident and death of Gerald D. Thomas, and was attending
court under a subpoena issued by the plaintiff. He had
been sitting in the hallway of the courthouse for several
days, but had not been asked to testify (R. 288). On October
11, 1947, at about 11 :00 o'clock in the morning, Ross was
in the scale house. The scale house is marked on the map,
Exhibit A, and is located 17'5 ·feet south of the south end
of the bin according to the scale of the map. The scale house
has a sort of bay window effect right in front. Ross was
keeping a close lookout from the window to see when the
coal for the bin would arrive (R. 290). He first saw the
two coal cars just after _they left the switch leading from the
load track to the bin track (R. 290), at a point marked
"R-1" on the map (R. 292). Ross noticed the cars first
through the bay window, then he stepped to the doorway
of the scale house (R. 2~90). The doorway faces the bin
(R. 2;98). He next saw the cars about 800 feet further
along the bin track at a point marked "R-2" on the map
(R. 292). As shown by Exhibit A, point "·R,.2" is past the
comparatively steep grade of the bin track and is where
the grade of the track is comparatively level. Ross estimated the speed of the cars at "R-2" at between 25 and 35
miles per hour (R. 291). Ross next saw the cars at the
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point marked "R-3" on the map, which is a point approximately 750 feet beyond "R-2". Ross estimated the
speed of the cars at "R-3" at 18 to 22 or 2,5 miles per hour
(R. 292). Ross next sa-w the cars as they entered the trestle
approach to the bin at a point marked "R-4" on the map
(R. 292), and at that point the cars were moving at a speed
of from 12 to 15 miles per hour (R. 296).
At this latter point, "R-4", Ross first noticed the brakeman, Thomas, on the head end of the two cars (R. 29'3').
Thomas hadn't applied· any brake, or anything (R,. 293).
Thomas was standing on the brake platform but was not
doing anything to the brakes ( R. 293). Thomas stood on
the br~ke platform, with his hand on the brake wheel in the
prescribed position, his head facing toward the bin in the
direction the car was moving ( R. 294) .
When the cars first entered onto the bin, they momentarily passed from Ross' view (R. 294), but next came into
view after they had passed the sign on the bin marked with
the inscription "Danger. Cars Not To Be Dropped Beyond
This Point" (R. 295). (As shown by Exhibit A~ this sign
is located 50 feet from the end of the bin.) As the cars
passed the "danger" sign, Ross saw Thomas standing on
the brake platform leaning over the brake wheel (R. 29·5,
306), but Thomas was not working the brake when the cars
first came into view at this point ( R. 306) . Thomas then
glanced over his shoulder at the danger sign, and "after he
passed the danger point, he applied the brake" (R. 295,
307). At that time, th~ cars were traveling at an estimated
speed of 8 to 12 miles per hour (R. 297). It appeared to Ross
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as though Thomas stepped down on the coupling of the car,
in order to get clear of the cars (R. 295). Ross saw the cars
for the last time after they had passed the "danger" sign.
They seemed to stay at the same speed of 8 to 12 miles per
hour ( R. 297) . He did not actually see the cars go over the
end of the bin. There were high tension electric lines around
and Ross protected himself by leaving the vicinity of the
scale house just before the cars went over the end of the
bin (R. 296).
Dodds testified as follows:

Dodds was Superintendent of ,coke operations for the
Utah Fuel Company (R. 310). At about 11 o'clock in the
morning on October 11, 1947, Dodds was returning to the
coke ovens from the Company office in Sunnyside. Dodds
was driving his automobile, accompanied by his assi~tant,
Mr. Hernberg. Dodds turned off the main highway into
a road leading to the bin and coke ovens. As Dodds turned
into the roadway, he saw two loaded coal cars just coming
off the main line track into the bin track (R.. 312). Dodds
and Hernberg noticed that the two cars were traveling at
an unusually high rate of speed. They spoke to each other
about the fact (R. 313). When Dodds saw the cars and
make the remark about there unusual speed, the automobile
Dodds was driving was traveling at a full 25 miles per hour
(R. 314, 315) in a direction approximately parallel with
the bin track. In going back and forth on that particular
roadway, Dodds has observed the speed of his automobile
many times. ·He -therefore judged the speed of the coal cars
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by the speed of his automobile (R. 314). The cars on the
bin track were going faster than his automobile.
The cars momentarily passed out of view and Dodds
next saw the cars at a point on the bin track marked "D-4"
on Exhibit A, a point about 1800 feet north of the approach
to the bin as scaled on the map (R. 315). Dodds' automobile was then at a point on the roadway marked "D-3,': on
Exhibit A, which point was roughly parallel with the cars
on the bin track and about 3,25 feet distant (R. 316). The
cars on the bin track were still traveling at a speed in excess of 25 miles per hour (R. 317). It would be Dodds' judgment when he observed them, that the cars were traveling
at a speed of aroun_d 30 miles per hour (R. 320). Dodds
could see Thomas standing on the brake platform of the
lead car. Thomas' face was towards the bin. He was not
doing anything with reference to the brakes. He was just
riding along, holding onto the brake wheel (R. 319).
Martin testified as follows:

Martin was employed by the defendant as General Gar
Foreman of the Grand Junction Division (R. 330). He was
familiar with the Ajax brake, its parts, and the manner in
which it operates (R. 331). He examined the cars that had
fallen over the bin at about 7:30 P. M. on the evening of
the day of the accident ( R. 335) . He inspected both cars
as soon as he arrived at the scene. This inspection was
made before anything was done to remove the cars or repair
the bin (R. 336). With respect to the first car that went
off the bin, No. 71619, Martin inspected the brake equipment with the aid of a powerful beam light. That night he
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inspected all parts of the brake on this car, excepting the
parts that were burie~ under the coal (R. 3·3.6). The brake
mechanism was partly in place (R. 337). No part of the
brake rigging was torn up or destroyed. The parts that
connect the brake rigging with the brake shoes were still
intact. The trucks of the wheels were disengaged from the
body of the car. No parts of the brake were broken or missing (R. 338). Of course he was not able to make any functional test of the brakes (R. 342·). The following morning
at 9:00A.M., Martin had the section men take the coal away
from the front end of the car. He inspected the Ajax braker
the brake housing and brake wheel on the lead end of the first
car, and they were absolutely okey. He did not find any
defect or imperfection whatsoever in any of the brake mechanism (R. 338).
Martin also observed the wheels of the first car that
went over the bin. He did not observe any flat places or
spots on these wheels, nor any indication that the wheels of
the car had slid at any time (R. 340). If the wheels had slid,
Martin would have been able to determine that fact from
his examination .. No flat spots were observed (R. 340).
There was no indication on the brake shoes that the brakes
had been applied with sufficient force to. slide the car
wheels (R. 341).
It is not true that if a car is in motion and the car can't

be stopped by the use of the brake, that there is necessarily
something wrong with the brake. With the power hand
brake, you can stop the car, providing you don't get the
car above a certain speed ( R. 342) . If the brakes are operated properly, the car would stop. If the car doesn't stop,
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then the car is going too fast ( R. 345) . There was absolutely
nothing wrong with the brakes on the car that went over
the.bin. The brakes were okey, and complied with the ICC
regulations, the Association regulations, and there was nothing broken on the car itself (R. 348). The brake on this
particular car was in the shop and inspected on September
17th (R. 346).

Evidence 're alleged absence of bumper device and hazardous construction of the bin.
There was little evidence with respect to the subject of
a bumper device on the bin or the nature of the construction
of the bin. The only witnesses whose testimony touched
upon these matters w_ere C. W. Robinson, the civil engineer
who prepared Exhibit A and testified on behalf of the plaintiff, and the defense witness, Arnett W. Dodds. All of their
testimony on these subjects is herein set forth:
A scale drawing showing a side view of the bin and
of the bumper device constructed at the end of the bin is
illustrated on plaintiff's Exhibit A. This Exhibit A also
shows a cross section of the south end of the bin, on a scale
of one inch equals six feet. Exhibit A was adopted and
introduced in evidence by the plaintiff. As indicated by Exhibit A, the bumper device constructed at the end of the bin
was elevated above the level of the track at about a 30° angle.
It was braced by 12" by 12" timbers. The tracks along the
top of the bin were curved up and into a point on the bumper
device.
The witness C. W. Robinson was employed by the defendant as assistant engineer in the Office of the Division
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Engineer at Grand Junction, Colorado. He was a civil engineer '(R. 115), and the map, Exhibit A, was drawn to
scale as accurately as possible (R. 166, 117). The slack coal
bin itself is 198 feet long (R. 123). The trestle approaching
the bin is 43.6 feet long (R. 123). The bin is what might
be called a great big box. The total height of the bin is
34 feet from the ground to the base of the rails on the top
of the bin (R. 123). About 1'6 feet of this height consists of
the upper part of the bin into which the coal is dumped
( R. 123), and which is lined on each side with 2 inch material. The bottom part of the bin is an open trestle composed
of 12" by 12" posts, 12" by 12" caps, and .3>'' by 12" braces.
The vents or underpinnings of the bin are at 6 foot intervals (R. 124).
In describing the construction of the bumper device,
Robinson testified that there were four 12" by 12" postS
going up to a 14" by 14" stringer. Above that stringer were
two 12" by 12" laid horizontally at right angles to the track.
On top of that were 9" by 18" stringers resting on top of the
two 12"by12"s at the top and end cap of the bin. On top of
that were standard gauge cross ties and rails which ran up
_and tapered to a point which came in as well as up, instead
of maintaining a standard gauge width. The elevation of
the tapered rails was approximately four feet above the
base of the rail on the surface of the bin (R. 135).
During the testimony of Robinson, the plaintiff introduced in evidence several photographs marked for identification as Exhibits C, D, E, F, G, H, and I. These photographs were taken after the accident and showed the bin
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in its damaged condition. Defendant objected to the introduction of these exhibits as immaterial because they illustrated the condition of the bin after the accident, but the
objection was overruled. Robinson testified that the condition of the bin before the accident was different from
that depicted in these photographs (R. 125). In the accident,
the bumper device at the end of the bin was destroyed (R.
134). Moreover, the end of the bin structure as shown in
the photographs was opened and damaged as a result of
the accident (R. 137). Before the accident, the bin was
approximately 18 feet longer than shown by the photographs
(R. 139).
The witness Dodds saw the bin immediately after the
cars had gone over the end of it. The structure of the bin
was not greatly damaged at that time (R. 32.9). The sides of
the bin were not torn down. There was no evidence of col-·
lapse of the bin at all. The cars didn't go into the bin and
slop out over the ground. The rails that were left on top of
the bin were torn off. They were not bent down, but ripped
completely off (R. 329). Later, a bulldozer appeared on
the scene and hitched onto the cars with cables and pulled
~. them clear. When this was done, the side braces at the
~ south end of the bin were torn off ( R. 3-29) . The siding and
uprights were ripped off by the bulldozer (R. 330).

STATEME:NT OF ERRORS
The trial court erred in submitting to the jury the
issue of whether the defendant had violated the Safety Appliance Act, 45 U. S. C. A. Sec. 11, since there was insuf1.

: ff
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ficient evidence to justify submission of this issue, and the
trial court should have granted defendant's request for a
peremptory instruction with respect to this issue. [See
Instructions Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 of the trial court (R. 6575) , and defendants requested Instruction No. 2 ( R. 47) .]
2.. The trial court erred in submitting to the jury the
issue of whether the defendant was guilty of negligence
with respect to the issues of ( 1) alleged absence of bumper
timbers or a bumper device at the end of the bin, and (2)
alleged hazardous construction of the bin, since there was
insufficient evidence to justify submission of these issues,
and the trial court should have granted defendant's request
for a peremptory instruction with respect to these issues.
[See Instruction No. 1 of the trial court (R. 65-68) and
defendant's requested Instruction No. 1 (R. 46).]
. 3. The 'trial court erred in instructing the jury in its
Instructions Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 with respect to the claimed
violation of the Safety Appliance Act, for the reason that
said instructions were repetitious, placed undue emphasis on
plaintiff's theory of the case, unbalanced the whole of the
charge to the jury, were misleading and inaccurate as statements of law, and were improper because of the insufficiency of the evidence.
4. The trial court erred in prejudicially instructing
the jury in its Instructions Nos. 7 and 8, for the reasons that
said instructions gave the jury a roving commission to find
the defendant guilty of negligence without reference to the
specific charges set forth in plaintiff's complaint or the
evidence submitted, also the instructions were abstract
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statements of the law which tended only to confuse and
mislead the jury.
5. The trial court erred in determining as a matter of
law that at the time of the accident and death of the deceased, both the defendant and deceased were engaged in
interstate commerce, since on the basis of the evidence this
jurisdictional issue of fact should have been submitted to
the jury. [See Instructions Nos. 4 and 6 of the trial court.]
6. The trial court erred in granting plaintiff's motion
to strike and sustaining plaintiff's demurrer to defendant's
· plea of set-off ( R. 369), since the set-off claimed by the defendant was expressly authorized by statute, 45 U. S. C. A.
Sec. 55.

7. The trial court erred and abused its discretion in
failing to order a new trial or order a remittitur of a portion
of the verdict, in view of the fact that the amount of the
verdict was grossly excessive, contrary to the evidence, and
the result of misund~rstanding, bias, and prejudice on the
part of the jury.
ARGUMENT
I.
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY VIOLATION OF
THE SAFETY APPLIANCE ACT AND THE TRIAL
COUR'T ERRED IN SUBMITTING SUCH ISSUE AND
IN REFUSING TO WITHDRAW IT FROM CONSIDERATION OF THE JURY.
Among the several issues which the trial court submitted to the jury in this case was the issue of whether there
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pliance Act, 45 U. S. C. A. Sec. 11. This particular issue
was submitted to the jury by the trial court's Instruction
No. 1, Instruction No. 2, Instruction No. 4, Instruction No.
5 and Instruction No. 6 (R. 65-6H, 71-76). A peremptory
instruction was requested by the defendant, removing this
issue from the consideration of the jury, but was refused by
the trial court (R.. 47). The defendant also sought to eliminate consideration of this issue, by means of a request
contained in paragraph two of its motion for directed
verdict ( R. 30), but the trial court also denied this
motion in its entirety (R. 354). Furthermore, the propriety
of submitting this issue to the jury was argued at length
at the hearing on defendant's motion for new trial, which
motion likewise was denied (R. 370-372.). Appropriate
exceptions were taken to the trial court's several rulings
with respect to this issue ( R. 354, 35,6-359).
Since the verdict rendered by the jury was general, it
very well may be that the jury arrived at its decision by
determining this particular issue against the defendant. ·
The likelihood of this is indicated by the failure of the jury
to make any deduction from the verdict on account of the
contributory negligence of the deceased, even though there
was cogent evidence from Which it could have been determined that negligence on the part of the deceased materially
contributed to the accident resulting in his death. Moreover,
counsel for plaintiff dwelled at length on the alleged violation of the Safety Appliance Act in his argument to the
jury, and the issue was pointedly emphasized by the trial
court in at least five repetitive instructions (R. 65-69, 7175).
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In the language of,the trial court's Instruction No. 1,
the particular issue submitted to the jury under the Safety
Appliance Act was whether or not the defendant "hauled
and permitted to be used and hauled on its tracks a car not
equipped with a sufficient hand brake, to wit: the leading
car of the two cars loaded with coal, thereby making it impossible for decedent, by the use of said brake, in the usual
and ordinary manner, to retard or control the speed of said
cars or to bring them to a stop on the trestle" ( R. 67) .
Under the law, as enunciated by the Supreme Court of
the United States in Myers v. Reading Company, 3-31 U. S.
477, 67 S. Ct. 1334, there are two recognized methods of
showing the inefficiency of hand brake equipment in order
to establish a case under the Safety Appliance Act, to-wit:
(1) "evidence may be adduced to establish some particular
defect;" or, (2i) "the same inefficiency may be established by
showing a failure to function, when operated with due care,
in the normal, natural, and usual manner." See Didinger
v. Pennsylvania Railroad Compa,ny, 39 F. (2d) 798, 79'9,
as quoted with approval in Myers v. Reading Company,
supra.
With respect to the first method of proving a violation
of the Safety Appliance Act, there is not a scintilla of evidence tending to prove any particular defect in the handbrake equipment of the car involved in this accident. Not
only is there no evidence of a particular defect, but there
is affirmative and uncontradicted evidence that no such
defect existed. The witness Martin made a thorough inspection of the braking equipment shortly after the accident and
found it to be in good mechanical condition throughout with
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no parts either broken or missing, except for some damage
caused by the cars falling from the bin (R. 338). The testimony of this witness is uncontradict~d in any particular.
The defendant is confident that no claim will be made by
the plaintiff that there is any evidence in this record tending
to establish any particular defect in the braking equipment.
It follows that unless there is substantial evidence tending to prove that the deceased operated the braking equipment with due care in the normal, natural and usual manner
and that it failed to function when so operated, no issue
involving the Safety Appliance Act is presented.

It is respectfully submitted that a review of all the
evidence in the case at bar, demonstrates a complete failure
of proof with respect to this issue. To the contrary, the
evidence establishes that the deceased did not apply the
hand brake of the car on which he was riding until the car
was less than 50 feet from the end of the coal bin structure,
that is, until the car had passed the sign onthe bin located
50 feet from the south end of the bin. Under no circumstances indicated by the evidence could the cars have been
stopped or prevented from passing over the end of the bin,
by operation of the hand brake at this point.
Only three witnesses testifieq at the trial who had some
knowledge of the circumstances immediately preceding the
accident, namely, Barnes, Schauster and Ross. Barnes and
Schauster were both more than a half mile distant. From
that distance, Barnes said that he could not be sure of the
speed of the cars ( R. 17~). He first saw the two coal cars
being ridden by the deceased when they were 400 to 600
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feet from the bin (~. 169). At that time, Barnes made the
remark to Schauster that the cars were "going too fast",
and he estimated their speed at from 8 to 10 miles per hour
(R. 169). On redirect examination, Barnes said that when
the cars approached the bin he would estimate they were
moving about 5 or 6 miles per hour (R. 193). He didn't
"imagine" that the cars were going over. 4 miles per hour
when they got onto the bin and as they were passing the
sign (R. 194). At that speed ·and with an Ajax brake in
good working order, Barnes was of the opinion that the
cars could have been stopped within "a couple of car lengths".
(R. 194) . Since a car length is about 50 feet ( R. 173), it
would have been impossible even under Barnes' testimony,
to have stopped the cars within the 50-foot space remaining
between the sign on the bin marked "Cars Must Not Pass
This Point" and the end of the bin. Interpreting "a couple
of car lengths" as at least two car lengths, would mean that·
in Barnes' opinion the cars when traveling at 4 miles per
hour would have required a stopping distance of at least
100 feet. Barnes' statement that the cars were gradually
slowing from a point 400 to 600 feet from the bin structure
would naturally be the case regardless of any application
of the brakes, since as shown by the plaintiff's Exhibit A,
the grade of the bin track gradually slackens and on the
bin itself and for some distance before reaching the bin is1
practically level (R. 121). Barnes of course did not and
could not see the deceased, Thomas, at· any time during the
movement of the cars down the bin track, and therefore could
not say whether Thomas ever applied or operated the brake
(R. 174, 175). So that Barnes' hypothesis with respect to
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stopping distance is really immaterial in any event, in the
absence of evidence that the deceased ever made any application of the hand brake at any of the points on the bin track
where the cars were seen by Barnes. The testimony of
Schauster adds nothing to that of Barnes.
The testimony of Ross is of signifance, since he was the
closest eye witness to the events connected with the accident.
This witness held a responsible position with the Utah Fuel
Company (R. 288). He had been subpoenaed by the plain. tiff, but for reasons which become obvious in the light of
his testimony was not put on the witness stand by plaintiff (R. 288). Ross stated that he watched the movement
of the coal cars down the bin track from the doorway of
the scale house (R. 290) ,. located according to Exhibit A
about 17 5 feet from the south end of the bin structure.
as the cars entered the approach to the trestle leading to
the bin, that is, the position marked "R-4" on Exhibit A,
the cars were moving at a speed of from 12 to 15 miles
per hour (R.. 2-92, 293). At that point Ross first noticed
Thomas standing on the end of the lead car on the brake
platform. At that time, Thomas hadn't applied any brake
( R. 293) . He was facing toward the bin in the direction
in which the cars were moving (R. 294). He was not doing ·
anything to the brakes (R. 293). The cars then momentarily
passed out of Ross' vision and he next saw them as they
passed the sign on the bin structure marked with the inscription "Danger. Cars Must Not Be Dropped Beyond This
Point" (R. 294, 295). At that time Thomas was standing
on the brake platform and was bent over the brake wheel,
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but he 'Was not doing anything to the brake when he first
came into view (R. 29·5). Ross then saw Thomas glance
over his shoulder at the "danger" sign, and "after he passed
the danger point, he applied the brake" (R. 295). This is
the only evidence in the record of any application of the
brake at any time by Thomas during his entire trip down
the bin track. At the time the brakes were applied for the
first time, the cars were moving according to Ross at an
estimated speed of from 8 to 12 miles per hour, and continued at that same relative speed so long as he observed
them (R. 2.96). Ross ceased his observation just before
the cars passed over the end of the bin structure ( R. 296) .
It thus will be seen that the only evidence in the case
of the application of the hand brake at any time by Thomas
was at a time after the car he was riding had passed the
second sign on the bin structure, that is, when the lead car
was less than 50 feet from the end of the bin. Obviously an
application of the brake at that late moment would have
afforded no opportunity for bringing the cars to a stop. In
this connection, consideration should be given to the testi:mony of both Barnes and Schauster to the effect that the
brake on the car was fully operative and in good working
order at the time the cars began their movement down the
bin track (R. 181, 254), also to the testimony of Car Foreman Martin to the effect that he made a detailed examination of the brake, the brake rigging and all pertinent equipment shortly after the accident and found nothing defective
or insufficient and found no brake parts broken or missing
(R. 338).
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Where then is the necessary evidence that the brake
failed to function, "when operated with due care, in the
normal, natural and usual manner"? Obviously there is
none. The brake was-never operated in any manner whatsoever until the cars involved were less· than 50 feet from
the end of the bin structure. It was then too late for a brake
functioning perfectly to stop the cars.
Plaintiff doubtless will urge that from the above evidence, it should be inferred : ( 1) that timely application
of the brake was made by the deceased; (2) that the brake
when applied was operated .with due care in the normal,
natural and usual manner; (3) that when so operated,
the brake failed to function ;-and then from this series
of inferences urge the further inference ( 4) that the brake
was defective-thereby creating an issue for the jury with
respect to the alleged violation of the Safety Appliance
Act. Any verdict based upon such an unwarranted proposition, involving as it does the piling of inference upon inference, has been repeatedly condemned by all the courts
,of the land. The United States Supreme Court has ex,pressly rejected such a proposition in numerous decisions.
Typical cases under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
are Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Chamberlain, 288 U. S. 333,
53 S. Ct. 391 and Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Coogan,
27fU. S. 472, 46 S. Ct. 564, 5 66.
In the Chamberlain case, supra, an action was brought
to recover for the death of a brakeman alleged to have been~
caused by the negligence of the defendant below. The plaintiff claimed that the deceased fell from a string of cars
which he was riding from the top of a "hump". The string
of cars descended the hump by the force of gravity. The
1
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string of cars ridden by the deceased was preceded by another string of cars a short distance ahead, and was followed
by still a third string of cars. The plaintiff's contention was
that the third string of cars violently collided from behind
with the string of cars on which the deceased was riding,
causing the deceased to fall to the ground and be run over
by a car or cars. The only testimony produced by the plaintiff to support his contention was a witness Bainbridge who
stated that he heard a "loud crash" after the three separate
strings of cars had passed him. Shortly thereafter, Bainbridge looked up the track and saw ~he second and third
strings of cars moving together and the deceased no longer
in sight. From this testimony, the plaintiff argued that a
jury issue was created in that it could be inferred that the
two strings of cars were negligently allowed to collide and
that the deceased fell and was killed as a result of the collision. But the Supreme Court held, speaking through Mr.
Justice Sutherland, that this would amount to piling inference upon inference and would not be justified under the
law, that the case should not be submitted to a jury. The
. Court said :

"* * * There is no direct evidence that in
fact the crash was occasioned by a collision of ·the
two strings in question; and it is perfectly clear that
no such fact was brought to Bainbridge's attention
as a perception of the physical sense of sight or of
hearing. At most there was an inference to that
effect drawn from observed facts which gave equal
support to the opposite inference that the crash was
occasioned by the coming together of other strings of
ears entirely away from the scene of the ·accident, or
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of the two-car string ridden by deceased and the
seven-·car string immediately ahead of it.
"We, therefore, have a case belonging to that
class of cases where proven facts give equal support
to each of two inconsistent inferences ; in which
event, neither of them being established, judgment,
as a matter of law, must go against the party upon
whom rests the necessity of sustaining one of these
inferences as against the other, before he is entitled
to recover.

* * *
"And the desired inference is precluded for the
further reason that respondent's right of recovery
depends upon the existence of a particular fact which
must be inferred from proven facts, and this is not
permissible in the face of the positiv~ and otherwise
uncontradicted testimony of unimpeached witnesses
consistent with the facts actually proved, from which
testimony it affirmatively appears that the fact
sought to be inferred did not exist * * *"
Again in the Coogan case, supra, under similar circumstances, the Court said :

"* * * As there is no direct evidence, it is
necessary to determine whether the circumstances are
sufficient to warrant a finding of fact. Whenever
circumstantial evidence is relied on to prove a fact,
the circumstances must be proved and not themselves
presumed."
In the case at bar, there is not a scintilla of evidence
that Thomas ever made timely application of the brake on
the car he was riding, with due care, in the normal, natural,
and usual manner, and that the brake when then thus applied
failed to function. It not only would be speculation and conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

jecture in its wildest form, but contrary to the direct evidence to infer from still other inferences that any such
application of the brake was made. Such unfounded speculation and conjecture as a basis for a verdict is contrary to
law. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Chamberlain, supra. In Grand
Trunk WesternR. Co. v. Holstein, 67 F. (2d) 780 (C.C.A. 6),
a safety appliance defect case, it was said "No jury should
be permitted to draw a conclusion from the evidence when
the proper conclusion to be drawn lies wholly within the
realm of speculation and conjecture." Neither can it be
presumed that Thomas made timely application of the brakes
in the normal manner, as part of any presumption of due
care on his part. This would be tantamount to drawing an
inference of negligence on the part of the defendant, from ,
a presumption of care on the part of the deceased. Such
illogic has been rejected by the Supreme Court in Looney
v. Metropolitan Railroad Co., 200 U. S. 480, 488, 2,6 S. Ct.
303, in the following language :

"* * * the negligence of a defendant cannot
be inferred from a presumption of care on the part
of the person killed. A presumption in the performance of duty attends the defendant as well as the
person killed. It must be overcome by direct evidence.
One presumption cannot be built upon another."
It is submitted that under the law and the evidence as
above set forth, the trial court erred in failing to remove
this issue of an alleged violation of the Safety Appliance

Act from the jury's consideration. The evidence was
clearly insufficient to support a verdict based upon such
an issue. By the uniform holdings of this Court, the
failure to limit the jury in its deliberation, to consideration
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only of those charged acts of negligence which are sustained and supported by proof, constitutes prejudicial error.
Fowkes v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 46 Utah 502, 151
Pac. 53; Kendall v. Fordham, 79 Utah 25·6, 9 P. (2d) 183;
Industrial Comm. v. Wasatch Grading Co., 80 Utah 223, 14
P. (2d) 988; Peterson v. Sorenson, 91 Utah 507, 65 P. (2d)
12. Since the verdict rendered in the present case was general and no one can tell whether or not the jury found for
the plaintiff upon the unproved issue improperly submitted
to it, the case should be reversed for a new trial. Schilling
v. Delaware & H. R. Corporation, 114 F. (2d) 69, 72, (C.
C. A. 2) ; Fowkes v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., supra.

II.
THER,E WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENlCE TO
JUS:TlFY SUBMISSION TO THE JURY OF THE ISSUES
OF ALLEGgD ABSENCE OF A BUMPER DEVICE AND
AULEGED HAZARDOUS CONSTRUCTION OF THE
BIN.
The trial court committed further error in submitting
to the jury the issues of: (1) alleged absence of bumper
timbers or bumper device at the end of the bin, and (2)
alleged hazardous construction of the bin ( R. 67),
together with the further issue of (3·) whether either of
these alleged conditions contributed to the accident resulting in the death of the deceased (R. 66). The allegationg
with respect to issues (1) an~ (2) were set forth as separate counts of negligence in plaintiff's complaint (R. 4-5).
The issues will be disc~ssed together. It should be borne
in mind, however, that under the general verdict returned
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by the jury, either one or all of the issues may have been
resolved ag·ainst the defendant, and if the evidence is. insufficient with respect to any one of the issues, the defendant
would be entitled to a new trial. A peremptory instruction
was requested by .the defendant, removing each and all of
the foregoing issues from consideration of the jury (R. 46).
But the trial court refused the defendant's request (R. 46,)
and proceeded to submit the issues to the jury by its Instruction No.1 (R. 67). No other or qualifying instructions with
respect to these issues were requested by the plaintiff or
given by the court.

It is submitted that the record in this case reveals a
complete absence of any evidence to support the above allegations, or of any evidence that such alleged negligence in
any manner proximately contributed to the accident forming
the basis of this lawsuit. On the contrary the record affirmatively contradicts such allegations.
The scale map introduced in evidence as the plaintiff's
Exhibit A, prepared by the defendant's engineering department, but adopted by plaintiff as his own exhibit (R.
116, 350), shows a detailed diagram of the trestle, the
bin and of the bumper device constructed at the end of
the bin. This scale map was introduced in evidence by
the plaintiff, without reservation, and was identified as
an accurate drawing of the bin structure and appurtenances.
(R. 116-117). C. W. Robinso~, the civil engineer who prepared the map, was called as a witness by the plaintiff.
Plaintiff is of course bound by his testimony. Robinson
described the bumper device as follows (R. 135) :
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"Q. Calling your attention to your diagram of
the slack bin here, will you describe a little more
fully this bumper that was located on the end, what
the construction of it was?

"A. Well, it is-there is four 12 by 12 posts going up here to a 14 by 14 stringer, and above that
stringer there are two 12 by 12's laid horizontally
at right angles to the track. On top of that is four
~ by 18 stringers that rest on the top of these 12 by
12's at the top and end cap of the bin, and on top of
that were standard gauge cross ties, and on top of
that were the rails which run up and tapered to a
point to come in as well as up, instead of maintaining a standard gauge width. As shown here, they
tapered in.
"Q.

In other words, the rails were going up to a

point?
"A.

Yes.

"Q.

About what would be the elevation?

"A. The end of that was approximately four
feet above the base of the rail of the track of the bin."
The several photographs of the bin introduced in evidence by the plaintiff, over objection of the defendant,
show the bin structure in a damaged condition and fail to
show any bumper device. It was admitted by all the witnesses, hmyever, including plaintiff's counsel, that the photographs were taken after the accident and illustrate the condition of the bin after the accident and after a bulldozer
had damaged the structure (R. 125, 130, 132).
The witness Arnett W. Dodds, stated that he observed
the bin directly after the accident and that there was "no
evidence of collapse of the bin at all" (R. 329'). The rails on
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

35
top of the bin wer~ not bent down, .they were ripped completely off (R. 329). The bulldozer that rerailed the two
coal cars tore the side braces off the bin and ripped the
sidings and end uprights off. Most of the damage to the bin
was caused by the bulldozer ( R. 330) .
There were no witnesses who offered any testimony
with respect to these particular matters excepting Robinson
and Dodds. What evidence does exist, however, squarely contradicts the plaintiff's allegations of negligence with respect
to the absence of a bumper device or hazardous construction
of the bin. It seems superfluous to labor the point that there
was no evidence to justify the trial court in submitting these
issues to the jury. In addition to refusing the defendant's
requested peremptory instruction No. 1, the attention of
the trial court also was called to the lack of evidence with
respect to these issues by paragraphs 3 and 4 of defendant's
motion for a directed verdict (R. 30), which likewise was
refused (~. 354). Again, the point was argued before the
trial court on defendant's motion for a new trial, but to no
avail (R. 370-372). Exceptions were taken to the several
adverse rulings (R. 356, 354).
Here there was a complete absence of probative facts to
support a verdict based upon any one of these particular
issues of alleged negligence. In the words of the Supreme
Court in the Myers case, supra :

"*. * * The requirement is for probative
facts capable of supporting with reason, the conclusion expressed in the verdiCt.
"'Petitioner was required to present probative facts from which the negligence and
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the causal relation could. reasonably be inferred. "The ess~ntial requirement is that
mere speculation be not allowed to do duty
for probative facts, after making due allowance for all reasonably possible inferences
favoring the party whose case is attacked."
* * *'"
Plainly, no heed was given by the trial court in the present
case to this elementary requirement of "probative facts"
with respect to the issues above discussed.
Even if there had been no bumper device at all, there
is not a scintilla of evidence in this case tending to show
that the presence or absence of a bumper device or of any
condition connected with the construction of the bin would
have made any difference so far as the accident to Thomas
is concerned.
Clearly, the trial court committed prejudicial.error in
failing to limit the consideration of the jury to the particular
charged acts of negligence sustained and supported by
substantial evidence. On the contrary, the jury were turned
loose to find the defendant guilty of any of the acts of
negligence alleged, regardless of the evidence or lack of
evidence adduced during the trial. See Peterson v. Sorensen,
supra, and the other authorities to the same ·effect cited
under Part I herein.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY GAVE TO THE
JURY A SERIES OF REPETITIOUS INSTRUCT'IONS
WITH RES1PEGT TO THE SA·FETY APPLIANCE ACT,
WHJlCH UNDULY E M P H A S I Z E D PLAINTIFF'S
THEORY OF THE CASE AND UNBALANCED THE
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

37

ENTIRE CHARGE TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE DEFENDANT.
The defendant submits that the trial court prejudicially
instructed the jury with reference to the alleged issue of a
violation of the Safety Applianc~ Act. As heretofore pointed
out, there was insufficient evidence to justify submission of
this issue in any event. But aside from this, the trial court's
instructions on this subject were defective in other substantial particulars.
In paragraph "B" of its Instruction No. 1, the trial
court defined and submitted to the jury the issue of a safety
appliance defect (R. 67). This was done by quoting the
language of the plaintiff's complaint, notwithstanding this
court's repeated condemnation of such practice. Fowler v.
Medical Arts Bldg., . Utah .. , 188 P. (2d) 711 (in which
case the same trial judge sat as in the case at bar) . Not
content with having submitted the issue to the jury in the
confusing language of the complaint, the trial judge proceeded to read to the jury at least four additional and repetitive instruction on t;he same subject, and in nearly consecutive order.
After Instruction No. 1, the court in Instruction No. 2
told the jury that the burden was on the plaintiff to prove ·
the negligence of the defendant and that such negligence
"consisted of some one. or more of the acts or omissions alleged in the complaint;" but then added, "or that the lead

car upon which deceased was riding at the time of the fatal
accident did not have a sufficient hand brake to retard or
control said cars in the usual and ordinary use, ftnd that
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such insufficiency, if any, was the proximate cause of the
fatal injury; and second, the amount of the damage resulting therefrom;" (R. 69). To say the least, this was an extremely confusing and loose statement of the law with respect to the manner of finding a violation of the Safety
Appliance Act on the basis of a functional failur~ of a brake,
in the light of the precise definition of the Myers case, supra.
Again, in paragraph 4 of Instruction No. 4, the trial
court quoted the statute setting forth the pertinent provisions of the Safety Appliance Act and its requirement with
respect to efficient hand brakes (R. 71). In paragraph 5
of the same instruction, the court quoted the .provision of
the Federal Employers' Liability Act which eliminates contributory negligence as a defense to violation of a safety
appliance enactment (R. 72). In paragraph 6, the jury were
told that the defendant was a common carrier subject to
provision of the Safety Appliance Act as quoted (R. 72). In
paragraph 7, the jury were told in two or three different
ways that defendant was liable for failure to maintain efficient hand brakes, regardless of how much care it might have
exercised to inspect, discover or remedy defects ( R. 72).
In paragraph 8, the requirements of the Safety Appliance
Act was again repeated in phraseology to the effect that if
the jury believed the defendant had violated the Act and
that such violation was a proximate cause of the fatal injuries to decedent, then a verdict should be returned for
the plaintiff (R. 72-73). In paragraph 9, the jury were told
that if it should be found from the evidence the decedent
made an application of the brake before the car he was riding reached the bin and the car could have been stopped "if
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said brake had reacted efficiently", then this evidence might
be considered by the jury in determining whether the brakes
were defective (R. 73). This was another loose statement
of the law with respect to finding a functional failure of a
brake under the Safety Appliance Act in view of the Myers
case; more than that it improperly authorized the jury to
find that the decedent made an application of the brake on
the car he was riding before the car reached the bin, when
there was not a scintilla of evidence upon which any such a
finding could be based and was in fact contrary to the only
affirmative evidence on the subject. See Jensen v. Utah Ry.
Co., 72 Utah 366, 270 Pac. 349, 358. In paragraph 10, the
jury were again informed that no conduct of the decedent,
whether negligent or not in the performance of his duties,
must be considered in connection with the "foregoing portions of this instruction" (R. 73). Thus the apparent impression was given that it could be infefred that timely
application of the brake was made by the decedent, with due
care, in the normal, natural, and usual manner, regardless .
of any evidence as to the conduct of the deceased with respect
to application of the brake. In paragraph 11 of the same
instruction, the jury finally were given the enlightening
information that the Safety Appliance Act, including the
portion of the Act here involved, was a statute enacted for
the safety of employees (R. 73).
1

·lt

In Instruction No. 5, the jury were advised still another time that a violation of the Safety Appliance Act by
the defendant would not be excused no matter how much
care the defendant exercised to discover or remedy defects
in the hand brake ( R. 74) .
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Again in Instruction No. 6, the trial court continued to
repeat and emphasize. In paragraph 1, the court determined
as a matter of law that defendant and decedent were engaged in interstate commerce at the time of the accident
and the plaintiff's cause of action .was "controlled by the
Federal Statutes hereinabove referred to" (R. 75). In paragraph 2, the trial court reiterated the proposition that if
the jury believed the defendant used the car on which decedent was riding, and the car was not equipped as provided
by the applicable section of the statute, then defendant could
be found to have violated "the said Federal Statutes", and
that if such violation were a proximate cause of the "fatal
injuries sustained by plaintiff" [sic], then the jury should
disregard all evidence pertaini~g to the decedent's conduct
and find for the plaintiff and award damages (R. 75). One
of the several vices of this instruction, aside from its repeti\
tious nature, is that in one paragraph it is determined as a
mat~er of law that the plaintiff's cause of action is controlled
by "Federal Statutes" apparently indicating the Federal
Employers' Liability Act as well as the Safety ·Appliance
Act, and in the next paragraph a safety appliance defect
is spoken of as a violation of "said Federal Statutes" and
in connection therewith the jury is informed that decedent's
conduct should be entirely disregarded. The impression
given is that decedent's conduct also should be disregarded
in connection with the --Federal Employers' Liability Act,
since it is one of ''said Federal Statutes".
This· constant hammering repetition and undue emphasis, coupled with misleading and inaccurate statements of
the law, most certainly would have a telling effect on the
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mind of the average juror. Not only was the same issue
submitted in two or three different forms of phraseology,
but all the pertinent statutes were read verbatim, then repeated is non-statutory terms, then applied in hypothetical
abstractions. Moreover, the decedent's lack of any responsibility for his own actions and the lack of any excusable
course of conduct on the part of the defendant was repeated
over and over again.
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Courts have condemned instructions containing such unfair repetition and undue emphasis in numerous cases. In
Risinger v. Sullivan (App. Tex.) 161 S. W. 397, an instruction unduly emphasizing and repeating plaintiff's theory of
the case was held to be reversible error. In Fantroy v. Schirmer .(App. Mo.) 29'6 S. W. 235, 238, the court condemned
on the ground of undue emphasis three separate instructions
to the effect that the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to
establish the facts. Another instance of undue emphasis
was involved in City of Lake Forest v. Janowitz, 295 Ill. App.
289, 14 N. E. (2d) 894, 896, where it was held error for the
court to give several substantially similar instructions relating to the contributory negligence of the plaintiff. Ana
i~ O'Hara v. Central Illinois Light Co., 319 Ill. App. 336, 4·9
N. E. (2d) 274, 278, four repetitive instructions on the
issue of damages was held to constitute error. See also
Carruthers v. Atlantic & Y. Ry. Co., 215 N. C. 675, 2· S. E.
(2d) 878, 879, for another example of undue emphasis
amounting to an expression of opinion on the part of the
trial court.

~~~
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Defendant excepted to the foregoing instructions of the
trial court upon the specific ground that the instructions as
given placed undue emphasis upon the plaintiff's case and
that the charge as a whole was unbalanced (R. 356). Defendant also excepted separately to each of the instruction~
above referred to (R. 356-359). Even if it were assumed
contrary to the fact, that there existed substantial evidence
of a violation of the Safety Appliance Act on the part of
the defendant, the instructions of the trial court as given
were patently biased, unbalanced, and unfairly repetitious.
The defendant's liability under the Safety Appliance Act,
and the decedent's lack of any responsibility for his conduct
figuratively were tossed back and forth all over the court
room, time and time again. It is interesting to note that the
trial court granted and gave without modification, each and
all of the eight instructions requested by the plaintiff (R.
35-44). The trial court marked refused four separate instructions requested by the defendant, and modified three
other requested instructions to such an extent that the instructions as given amounted to refusals (R. 46-49, 51-53,
5·6). No fair-minded person can read the whole charge
given, without gaining an immediate impression that the
trial court forgot that there was a defendant in the action
and considered only the plaintiff's cause as worthy of consideration by the jury.

IV.
THE TRIAL COURT' ERRONEOUSLY INSTRUCTED
T·H~ JURY IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 7 A~D 8, BY
GIVING THE JURY A ROVING COMMISSION TO
FIND DEFENDANT GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE WITHSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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OUT REFERENCE TO THE PARTICULAR ACT'S OF
NEGLIGENCE CHARGED IN PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT OR ESTABLISHED BY THE EVIDENCE.
In its complaint in this case, the plaintiff alleged the
negligence of the defendant in varidqs particular counts
(a) to (d) inclusive (R. 4-5). One of these counts denominated "(a)" alleged that the defendant used an unsafe
method of moving and placing cars on the bin, in this : 'fthat
in lieu of using. a locomotive to control the speed and momentum of said cars as they were moving downward along the
track leading to the trestle, defendant cut said cars loose
and placed them in motion on said track, and required decedent to station himself on the leading or forward end of
the first of said cars with no means of controlling their
speed or momentum except the hand brakes, and that said
hand brakes were wholly insufficient *- * *" (R. 4).
This was the only allegation in the whole complaint based
upon any unsafe method of moving cars on the coal bin.
Evidence with respect to this allegation was add~ced by
both sides. The trial court submitted the issue to the jury
by paragraph marked "A" of its Instruction N'o. 1, in
the same language as set forth is plaintiff's complaint (R.
66).

In paragraph 1 of Instruction No; 7, however, the trial
court furt~er told the jury that if an employer's business
was hazardous, it was the duty of the master to adopt reasonable safe methods of work, and then i~ paragraph 2' of
the same instruction the court added :
"You are instructed that if you shall find and
believe from a preponderance of the evidence in thisSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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case that the nature of defendant's business and work
incident thereto in moving cars loaded with coal over
the bin track onto the trestle above the bins at Sunnyside, Utah, was such as to impose upon said defendant the duty to adopt and prescribe a reasonable

safe method e; methods of performing such work and
moving and spotting such cars and that the defendant
failed and neglected to adopt or prescribe such reasonable safe methods and that such failu~e and neglect
on the part of the defendant proximately caused or
proximately contributed to the cause of the accident
which resulted in fatal injuries to Gerald Dallas
Thomas [sic], then you should find in favor of the
plaintiff and ag.ainst the defendant." (R. 76.)
Again in paragraph 2 of Instruction No. 8, the trial court
told to the jury :
"Therefore, if you shall find from a preponderance
of the evidence that the decedent, Gerald Dallas
Thomas, sustained his injuries while in the course of
his employment, by reason of the negligence of one
or more of defendant's employees, while the said employee or employees were in the course of their employment, then such negligence is imputed to and
becomes the negligence of the defendant in this case."
(R. 77.)
These instructions were duly excepted to by the defendant,
b_oth with respect to' the instructions as a whole and with
respect to each of the above quoted paragraphs thereof (R.
359, 360).
The most obvious vice of these instructions is that they
give to the jury a roving commission to find the defendant
guilty of any and all negligence which may occur to them,
without in any way limiting the jury's consideration to the
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particular acts or omissions charged as negligence in the
complaint. For example, the complaint specifically charges
an unsafe method of work, in that, cars were allowed to run
down the bi:r:t track on their own momentum instead of using
an engine to control them. But paragraph 2 of Instruction
7, throws the door wide open for the jury to find the defendant liable for the accident and death of Thomas if the
defendant failed and neglected to adopt or prescribe reasonable safe methods in moving and spotting cars, without .reference to or limitation of the jury to a consideration of the.
one particular alleged unsafe method described and set forth
in t~e. complaint. And in paragraph 2 of Instruction
8, the jury were informed that defendant was responsible
for the "neligence" of its employees, without any relationship of such negligence to that charged in plaintiff's complaint. In effect, these two instructions advised the jury
to look and find negligence wherever they might, regardless
of the pleadings in the____case. Instructions of this type have
been repeatedly condemned by this and other courts. In
Herring v. Chicago and A. R. Co., 299 Ill. 214, 132 N. E. 792,
the plaintiff sought recovery for personal injuries sustained
in a collision between an automobile in which he was a passenger and a train operated by the defendant at a -public
crossing. Plaintiff charged several specific acts of negligence. The defendant denied any negligence and pleaded
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. The
court instructed the jury as follows:
"The court instructs the jury that the law is that
the negligence of the driver of the automobile cannot
be imputed to the plaintiff, and if the jury believe
from the preponderance of the evidence that the
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plaintiff was injured while in the exercise of due care
and caution for his own safety at and prior to the
time of the accident, as alleged in the declaration, or
some count thereof, through the negligence of the
defendant, then the jury will find the defendant
guilty."
This instruction was held to constitute reversible error, the
court stating in the course of its opinion:
"An instruction of this character permits the
jury to wander afield and return a verdict against
a defendant for what they might fancy to be an act
of negligence, though the act so considered by them to
be negligent was one which the law would not recognize as actionable.· In a case where the evidence is as
· conflicting as it is in this case, the fact that the law
may be correctly stated in other instructions will not
obviate the error committed in giving a bad instruction. In view of the record in this case we must hold
that the giving of this instruction was reversible
error."
Grifenhan v. Chicago Railways Company, 299 Ill. 590,
132 N. E. 790, involved a collision between an automobile in
which the plaintiff was riding as a passenger and a railway
bus operated by the defendant. The plaintiff charged specific acts of negligence and the defendant asserted that the
negligence of the dri{rer of the car in which the plaintiff was
riding was the cause of the injury. The jury were instructed
as follows:

"The court instructs the jury that, if the negligence
of two parties proximately contribute~ to cause an
accident through which a third party is injured, it is
not alone a defense for one of said parties to show
that the other was also guilty of negligence which
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contributed to cause the injury to the third party, if
the third party was at and before the time of the
happening of the accident in the exercise of ordinary
care."
A judgment in favor of the plaintiff was reversed upon the
basis of the foregoing instruction. The court said :

~! ·.

WI!,
IIYo

,,

lr .

:fu'

"* * * This instruction does not limit the
negligence of defendant to that charged in the declaration. It tells the jury that defendant would be liable
for the injury if it was guilty of any negligence,
whether it was charged in the declaration or not. The
only negligence attempted to be charged in the declaration is the negligent operation of the street car.
The jury might assume that it was the duty of defendant to keep the pavement on this street in repair,
and that the presence of the holes in the pavement was
the result of defendant's negligence. It might assume
that the street car was negligently constructed, and
·that the body of the car projected too far beyond the
rails, and that the operation of the car with this un~
usually wide overhang was negligence on the part of
defendant. It might assume any number of things
which it might fancy or imagine was negligence on
the part of defendant, and then, under this instruction, find defendant guilty. It is elementary that recovery can only be had upon the negligence charged
in the declaration."

l1i

Another example is Industrial Commission v. Wasatch
Grading Company, supra. There the plaintiff recovered
judgment for personal injuries alleged to have been caused
by the defendant negligently running into him with a truck
loaded with gravel. There was no allegation in the complaint
that the defendant had failed to keep the steering device
of the truck in proper repair. T'he trial court, however, inSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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structed the jury that testimony had been offered and received to the effect that the steering device on the truck
failed properly to operate and if they found that to be a fact,
and that the steering device failed to function because of
defendant's failure to keep it in proper repair, the verdict
-should be for the plaintiff.. The judgment was reversed because of the error in this instruction. The Court said :
"Defendant objected to the foregoing instruction and
assigns the giving thereof as error. Nowhere in the
complaint is it charged that the defendant was negligent in failing to keep the steering device of the
truck in question in proper repair. There is no general language in the complaint which can be said to
charge such negligence * * *. It is a well-established rule of law in this, as well as other jurisdictions, that the acts of negligence relied upon by the
plaintiff for a recovery must be both alleged and
proved. It is reversible error to instruct the jury
that they may find a verdict for a plaintiff because
of some negligence which is not pleaded or which is
without support in the evidence." (citations)
Moreover, the trial court's Instructions Nos. 7 and 8 in
the instant case are prejudicial and erroneous for the further
reason that in substance and effect they are mere statements
of abstract principles of law, outside of the issues and the
evidence. This court discussed this principle of law in
Belnap v. Widdison, 32. Utah 246, 90 Pac. 393, where the
plaintiff sought to recover damages to his crops caused by a
flood which it was alleged the defendant negligently caused.
The trial court instructed the jury that the plaintiff could
not sit passively by without trying to prevent the damage.
There was no evidence, however, that the plaintiff had had
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any opportunity to mitigate the damage. The instruction
therefore was held reversible error, the court stating:

"* * * The rule is well settled that instructions should be predicated upon the pleadings and
evidence in the case, and that an instruction, even
though it may contain a correct statement of the law
in the abstract, if it has no application to the issues
and evidence in the case, should be refused. The reason for the rule is that instructions not pertinent to
the c~se have a tendency to mislead the jury and to
draw their minds from the issues in the case. The
instruction, while it correctly states the law as an
abstract proposition, has no application whatever to
the facts in this case and was therefore erroneous, and
the giving of it could not have been other than prejudicial to the interests of the plaintiff."
Again, in Jensen v. Utah Railway Company, supra, this court
criticized as error the giving of instructions on abstract
principles of law, in the following language:

"* * * The rule is well settled that in instructing
a jury, a mere abstract or statement as to the law
should be avoided, and that all instructions should be
applicable to the evidence on either one or the other
of the respective theories of the parties. Instructions which are not so applicable, though abstractly
they may be correct, are not helpful to the jury, are
apt to be misleading and to be improperly applied."
In view of the authorities above cited, the conclusion
necessarily follows that Instructions Nos. 7 and 8 in the
present case were erroneous and prejudicial.
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v.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING
AS A MATTER OF' LAW THAT BOTH DEFENDANT
AND THE DECEDANT WERE ENGAGED IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE, AND THEREFORE THAT PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO THE BENEF'IT OF THE
REMEDY AFFORDED BY THE FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABIL,ITY kCT.
In his complaint filed in this case, the plaintiff alleged
in paragraph IV thereof that "on the tracks of the defendant and within the yards where the fatal accident occured,
defendant at all times herein mentioned maintained a highway of interstate commerce, and defendant was and now is
engaged in interstate commerce and transportation in the
States of Utah and Colorado, and decedent was employed
by defendant in such commerce, and that the injuries resulting in the death of decedent as herein complained of
occurred in the course of and while he and defendant were
mutually engaged in the conduct of interstate commerce and
transportation by rail" (R. 2). In its Answer to the foregoing allegation, the defendant entered both a general and
a specific denial (R. 12).
At the trial, the plaintiff rested his case in chief, without putting in any evidence whatsoever with respect to the
foregoing issue raised by the pleadings (R. 287). The defendant introduced evidence with respect to other issues and
then rested its case (R. 349). Counsel for plaintiff then
again announced that plaintiff rested his case (R. 349).
The trial court then stated in the presence of the jury "There
was the matter of that stipulation you mentioned last night"
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(R. 349). * Thereafter, the court allowed counsel for plaintiff to state orally, in the presence of the jury, a stipulation
which had been previously agreed to by defense counsel.
The stipulation was as follows: "The Denver and Rio
Grande Western Railroad Company is a railroad corporation engaged in interstate commerce by rail, in the States of
Utah and Colorado, and that on the track where this accident
occurred, and on adjacent tracks, coal is transported in
both intrastate and interstate commerce (R. 350). This stipulation was the only evidence introduced at the trial on this
all important issue. It will be noted that the foregoing stipulation failed to cover the question of whether at the time
of the accident, the defendant· and the decedent, or either,
were engaged in interstate commerce, or specifically whether
the cars of the defendant which decedent was riding at the
time of his accident were moving in interstate commerce
or whether the duties of the decedent at the time of the
accident in any way directly or closely and substantially
affected such interstate commerce.
1

Instead of submitting this vital issue to the jury, or in
view of the insufficiency of the evidence, of determining it
in favor of the defendant as a matter of law, the trial court
in its instructions to the jury proceeded to resolve the issue
in favor of the plaintiff as a matter of law. In paragraph
1 of its Instruction No. 6, the court stated: "You are instructed that the court has determined as a matter of law
that the defendant and decedent were mutually engaged in
*Although the record is silent, the facts are that after the close
of court the previous evening, the trial judge called to the attention
of counsel for plaintiff the lack of evidence with respect to this issue.
Counsel for plaintiff then approached defense counsel with a proposed
oral stipulation which was agreed to.
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interstate commerce at the time and place of the fatal injuries to decedent as complaint [sic] of by plaintiff, and
that any cause of action which plaintiff may have to recover
damages for such injuries arises out of and is controlled by
the Federal Statutes [presumably the court refers to the
Federal Employers' Liability Act and the Safety Appliance
Act] hereinbefore referred to" ( R. 7 5) . The trial court also
determined this issue against defendant as a matter of law
by necessary implication in paragraphs 2, 3 and 5 of Instruction No. 4. Exceptions were taken by the defendant to the
whole of Instruction No. 4, and separately as to each offending paragraph thereof ( R. 358) .
1

By its very terms, the Federal Employers' Liability Act
is applicable only under particular circumstances where interstate commerce is involved. The pertinent portion of the
Act provides as follows:
"Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any of the several states
* * * shall be liable in damages to any person
* * *' while he is employed by such carrier in
such commerce * * *
"Any employee of a carrier, any part of whose
duties as such employee shall be in furtherance of
interstate or foreign commerce; or shall, in any way
directly or closely and substantially, affect such commerce as above set forth shall, for the purposes of
this chapter, be considered as being employed by such
carrier in such commerce and shall be considered as
entitled to the benefit of this chapter." 45 U. S. C.
A. Sec. 51.

~t

Although the stipulation above referred to probably
was sufficient to justify the trial court in holding, as it did
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in paragraph 6 of its Instruction No. 4, that the defendant
was subject to the provisions of the Safety Appliance Act
(R. 72), the stipulation falls far short of supplying evidence
that both the decedent and defendant were as a matter of
law sufficiently eng·aged in interstate commerce at the time
of the accident to come within the purview of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act. The Safety Appliance Act applies
to equipment used by a railroad even in intrastate commerce,
provided the railroad is a highway of int~rstate commerce.
Texas and Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 2'41 U. S. 33, 36 S. Ct.
482. But the Federal Employers' Act affords a cause of
action only where the employer is engaged in interstate commerce and the employee also has duties either in furtherance
of interstate commerce or directly or closely and substantially affecting such commerce.
In the case at bar it may be conceded under all the evidence, together with the stipulation referred to, that: the
decedent, Thomas, was a brakeman in the employ of defendant at the time of the accident resulting in his death;
he was riding cars of coal from the load track at Sunnyside,
Utah, onto the bin track and therice to the bin just prior to
the accident resulting in his death ; on the tracks where the
accident to decedent occurred and on adjacent tracks, coal
is transported generally in both interstate and intrastate
commerce; defendant is a railroad corporation engaged in
interstate commerce. It is not conceded and there is no
evidence that: ( 1) the particular cars on which decendent
was riding at the time of the accident were moving in interstate commerce, or (2) the duties of the decendent at the
time of his injury were either in furtherance ~f interstate
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commerce or in any way directly or closely and substantially
affecting such commerce.
The most that the plaintiff possibly could claim under
the foregoing circumstances would be that an issue of fact
had been created for determination by the jury. Instead,
the trial court resolved the issue as a matter of law in favor
of the plaintiff. This was contrary to law and constitutes
reversible error.

A vance v. Thompson, 387 Ill. 77, 55 N. E. (2d) 57, cert.
denied 323 U. S. 753', 65 S. Ct. 8~, is a recent case directly
in point. In that case the plaintiff was riding one of a cut
of cars being moved in a switching operation in connection
with the making up of a train which was to move from
Bismark, Missouri to Poplar Bluff, Missouri. Plaintiff fell
from the car he was riding and was injured, due to the alleged negligence of the defendant. There was disputed evidence as to whether one or more of the cars involved were
being moved in interstate commerce during the switching
movement, and therefore as to whether at the time of accident and injury to plaintiff the work in which he was
engaged was in furtherance of interstate commerce. Notwithstanding the state of the evidence, the trial court instructed the jury as a matter of law that the plaintiff and
defendant were engaged in interstate commerce at the time
the accident occurred. The Supreme Court of Illinois held
this to be reversible error, stating as follows :

"* * * We are not convinced that plaintiff's duties at the time of the accident are so conclusively
shown to be in furtherance of, or were so substantially
connected with, interstate commerce as to authorize
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the trial court to decide such question as one of law
instead of leaving it to the jury.
"The allegation in the complaint that the plaintiff's duties were in connection with interstate commerce was one of the contested issues in the case,
and raises the question whether, under the facts, the
trial court should have instructed the jury that such
allegation had been established as a matter of law.
The rule laid down is that where the facts are in
dispute, or more than one inference can be drawn
from them, the question whether the injured employee was at the time in interstate commerce is a question for the jury. Pennsylvania Co. v. Donat, 239
U. S. 50, 36 S. Ct. 4, 60 L. Ed. 139'; Southern Railroad Co. v. Lloyd, 239 U. S. 496,, 36 S. Ct. 210, 60 L.
Ed. 402. The amendment of 1939, U. S. C. A. Title
No. 45, Sec. 51, has not changed the rule in this respect."
The apparent aim of the 1939 Amendment to the Federal Employers' Liability Act was to eliminate the necessity
of determining whether an employee, at the very instant of
his injury or death, was actually engaged in the movement
of interstate traffic, thereby enlarging the group to be benefited by the Act. See H oll v. Southern Pac. Co., 71 F. Supp.
21, 23. Yet, the Act still requires a finding that at the time
of the accident, the duties of the employee "shall be in furtherance of interstate * * * commerce" or in some way
"directly or closely and substantially, affect such commerce."
Otherwise, the statute means that Congress intended to include all employees of interstate railroads under the Act.
As stated in H oll v. Southern Pac. Co., supra:
"It was, no doubt, the object of the amendment
to enlarge the railroad transportation group to be
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benefited by the Act. This was achieved not by changing the main section, but by adding a new clause to
it. The main section still left the test of liability that
the 'employee be 'employed by such carrier in such
commerce'. However, the new clause increased the
group by adding those whose duties, in whole or in
part, directly, closely or substantially affect interstate commerce. (citation)
"The plaintiff was employed as a clerk in the
freight claim department * * *. Her work * * *
was in no way a part of interstate commerce or in
furtherance of it.

* * *

"* * * I do not think that it was the intention
of the Congress to include such employees [i. e. employees such as the plaintiff] and to withdraw them
from the protection of State Employers' Liability
Laws. On the contrary, I am of the view that had
Congress intended to include them, it would have
amended the first part of Section 51 ,by omitting the
words 'in such commerce'. This would have extended
the Act to 'any person suffering injury while he is
employed by such carrier,' and would have placed

all employees of interstate railroad under the Act,
·whether their work be clerical or not, or in any way
connected with the interstate commerce or not. It
would have made the sole test the interstate nature
of the business of the carrier. This it could have done
constitutionally even if it had included employees and
activities clearly local and intrastate.

* * *
"But the Congress did not do so. And I do not
find in the cases which have arisen under the amendment any judicial sanction for doing it by interpretation.
·

* * *
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"In sum, I feel that the wording of the 19'39
Amendment, its legislative history, and the interpre. tation which the courts have placed upon it, stand
in the way of the plaintiff's right to recovery in this
case."
An employee of a railroad company is not entitled to
sue and claim the benefits of the remedy provided by Federal
Employers' Liability Act, unless it is first determined either
by a court or a jury that both the carrier and the employer
were engaged in interstate commerce, when the employee's
injury or death occurred. A failure to make a proper disposition of this preliminary question, constitutes a jurisdictional defect, striking at the heart of the statutory remedy sought by the plaintiff in the present case. It is submitted, therefore, that the failure of the trial court in the
· case at bar to submit to the jury the issue of interstate commerce was plain error, jurisdictional in nature, and should
be corrected by an order for a new trial.
VI
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO SET'-OFF AGAINST
THE JUDGMENT, IF ANY, IS EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED BY STATUTE.
"

Prior to trial of this case, but after complaint and
answer, the defendant filed a claim for set-off in the amount
of $4,923.98 against any judgment which the plaintiff might
be awarded in the pe.nding action (R. 16-18). This claim was
included in·defendant's amended answer and alleged in substance that: (1) the defendant had contributed certain sums
to the Treasury of the United States for the benefit of its
employees upon their retirement or for the benefit of the
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immediate dependents of such employees in the event of the
death of the employees before their retirement; (2) on account of the death of Gerald D. Thomas, his dependent widow
and minor children had received or were entitled to receive
from the contributions so made by the defendant, certain
annuity payments in stipulated amounts; ( 3) of such annuities, the defendant had contributed one-half of the sums
payable and defendant therefore was entitled to a set-off
of an. amount equivalent to one-half of the present value of
such annuities (R. 16-18). On motion of the plaintiff, the
trial court struck this claim for set-off from the pleadings
and sustained a general demurrer thereto filed by the
plaintiff (R. 3-69).
The defendant bases its right to a set-off such as pleaded
upon the provisions of Section 5 of the Federal Employers' .
Liability Act, 45 U. S. C. A. Sec. 55, which reads as follows:

:i:'!!~

"* * * That in any action brought against
any such common carrier under or by virtue of any
of the provisions of this chapter, such common carrier may set off therein any sum it has contributed
or paid to any insurance, relief benefit, or indemnity
that may have been paid to the injured employee or
the person entftled thereto on account of the injury
or death for which said action was brought."
Certainly, the allegations of defendant's pleading with reference to set-off, established a claim within the literal language
of the quoted statute. In its argument in the trial court,
however, plaintiff relied upon certain cases which he claimed
supported the proposition that such a set-off should not be
authorized. A review of the cases cited by plaintiff follows:

··m
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McCarthy v. Palmer, et al., 113 F. (2d) 721 (C.C.A. 2)
is a case in which the defendants, railroad trustees, claimed
that they were entitled to a set-off or reduction of the plaintiff's judgment to the extent of an annuity payable under
the Railroad Retirement Act to individuals totally and permanently disabled for regular employment. Defendants also
claimed a set-off equal to the amount of the annuity plaintiff would be eligible to receive upon reaching the age of
60, computed upon the basis of plaintiff's life expectancy
or in the alternative, to a set off to the extent of defendant's
contributions to such annuity. The Circuit Court held that
no set-off should be permitted for the reason that the plaintiff has not been brought by the evidence and findings
within any class entitled to benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act. With respect to defendant's claim that the
plaintiff was totally and permanently disabled within the
meaning of the act, the parties stipulated that the trial judge
should decide the issue on the evidence, and the judge failed
to find that the plaintiff was so disabled. This finding apparently was not questioned on appeal. With reference to
defendant's claim that the plaintiff will be eligible for an
annuity upon reaching the age of 60, the proof indicated that
plaintiff had not yet attained that age.
It is to be noted that the claim for set-off in the M cCarthy v. Palmer case was disposed of on the basis of a
failure of proof to show that plaintiff was presently entitled
to any annuity benefits. Of course under such circumstances
no set-off could be allowed, but not because ·the claim was
improper as a matter of law. In the case at bar, on the other_
hand, the pleading alleges that particular persons "entitled
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thereto" had received or were entitled to receive the annuities
payable, on account of the death of Gerald Dallas Thomas,
for which said action was brought. Whether or not the defendant could prove this allegation is beside the point. The
allegation was made in good faith and states a proper ground
for set-off. The defendant should be permitted to introduce
evidence to support its allegations, just as the defendants in
the McCarthy v. Palmer case were permitted to do.

;

Chiefly relied upon by plaiiJtiff in his argument before
the trial court was the case of Hetrick v. Reading Co., 39· F.
Supp. 22 (Dist. Ct., N. J.). This was a suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for damages on account of
personal injuries, and in which the plaintiff claimed that he
was totally and permanently disabled. In partial answer to
the complaint, the defendant alleged that if plaintiff were
totally and permanently disabled as alleged, he was entitled
to receive an annuity of a certain amount under the Railroad
Retirement Act, and if plaintiff was entitled to damages
from defendant, such damages should be mitigated by deducting the present value of the annuity due for the remainder of plaintiff's life. Plaintiff made a motion to strike
this defense from the pleadings, which the trial court
granted. The trial court held that the fund created by contributions from the employer and the employee was the inherent right of the employee which became crystalized upon
the occurrence of designated prerequisites. The provisions
of the Railroad Retirement Act and the F'ederal Employers'
Liability Act could be comingled, said the court, and it was
not true as urged by the defendant, that the railroad would
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be paying twice for the same injury. Also the court did not
think that an annuity based upon total and permanent disability was ever intended as compensation. Finally, the
court concluded that it did not appear that the plaintiff
had yet received any benefits out of the fund to which the
defendant had contributed. Furthermore, it did not appear
that any benefits would be paid to plaintiff in the future so
far as the "proofs" were concerned, unless the Railroad Retirement Board granted plaintiff such relief, and even if an
annuity were granted, its continuance would be uncertain
because it would depend upon continuance of the disability.
The reasoning of the opinion is not too clear. It would
be interesting to know for example, what "proofs" the court
referred to in its opinion, since the only problem before it
was the legal sufficiency of defendant's plea of set-off. Be
that as it may, none of the "reasoning" of the court 'in the
Hetrick case is at variance with the defendant's contentions
in the present case-. For instance, it· is not disputed in the
case at bar, but that the right to payments of stipulated annuities to the widow and children of deceased under the
Retirement Act becomes crystallized upon the occurrence
of designate'd prerequisites. Defendant's pleading alleges
that these prerequisites have occurred. Nor does defendant
make any attempt to comingle the Railroad Retirement
Act and the Federal Employers' Liability ·Act, on the
ground that a dual recover for the same injury would be
provided. In Hetrick case, the defendant's pleading and
"proof" were apparently faulty. Moreover, the court's
"reasoning'' in that case seems to disregard entirely the express authorization for set-off contained in Section 5 of the
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Federal. Employers' Liability Act, 45 U. S. C. A. Sec. 55.
The court seems to lose itself in concern over whether or
not double recovery would be permitted and then rejects
the claim for set-off on the ground that an annuity under
the Railroad Retirement Act was not intended as compensation for negligent injury by a carrier. In the case at bar,
however, the defendant makes no contention either that
such annuities are intended as compensation or that double
recovery would be permitted unless a set-off were allowed.
It is submitted therefore that the Hetrick case offers dubious
authority for plaintiff's position.
Defendant does not contend that any right to set-off
would exist in this case, except for the specific provisions of
the statute involved, namely, Section 5 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U. S. C. A. Sec. 55. That statute
states in plain language that in any action brought against
the carrier under the provisions of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, the carrier may set-off its contributions to
any insurance or relief benefit that may have been paid to
the person entitled thereto on account of the death for which
the action was brought. Defendant's pleading alleges the
exact situation set forth in the statute. There is nothing
in the Railroad Retirement Act inconsistent with such a
claim or with the statute upon which the claim is founded.
This same subject was discussed, incidently, in Chicago Great Western Ry. Co. v. Peeler, 140 F. (2d) 865,
(C.C.A. 8). In that case the defendant contended the trial
court erred in rejecting its offer of proof that "the plaintiff
has since his accident in this case rece'ived a pension from
the Railroad Retirement Board; that one-half of that pension
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was paid for by the Railroad Company and one-half by the
plaintiff himself." This offer was objected to by the plaintiff and the objection sustained. Upon appeal, it was held
that the offer of proof was properly excluded for the reason
that no claim for set-off had been asserted in the defendant's
answer. The Circuit Court stated:
"The question presented is interesting. It has
been discussed by the courts in McCarthy. v. Palmer,
2 Cir., 113 F. (2d) 721, 723, and ·in Hetrick v. Reading Co., D. C. N. J., 39 F. Supp. 22. Neither case is
helpful here. In the McCarthy case the question arose
on an appeal from a finding of the court as a result
of a stipulation, and in the Hetrick case on a motion
to strike an affirmative claim for a set-off under
the Act. In the present case no claim to a set-off is
asserted in the answer. The objection, therefore,
that the offered evidence was not material or relevant to any issue was properly sustained. * * *
"Appellant contends that it was entitled to make
proof of the pension on cross examination of the
plaintiff in mitigation of damages. If appellant is
entitled to any benefit in this action from its contributions to the Railroad Retirement fund it is byway
of set-off only, as provided in the statute. Wit~out
the aid of the statute an employer can not set up in
mitigation of damages in a tort action by an injured
employee, indemnity from a collateral source, such
as insurance or compensation or benefits under a
Workmen's Compensation Act, even where the defendant has contributed to the fund. Overland Const.
Co. v. Sydnor, 6 Cir., 70 F. (2d) 3'38, 340; Liggett &
Myers Tobacco Co. v. De Parcq, 8 Cir., 6,6 F 2d 678,
687 688; 25 C. J. S., Damages, Sec. 99. We are not
called upon, therefore, to decide whether a pension
under the Railroad Retirement Act is a proper set-off
to the plaintiff's claim, or whether it is excluded under Sec. 58, supra, of the Federal Employers' Liabil1

•
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ity Act. The objection to the offered proof was properly sustained in any event for the reason that the
claim for set-off was not in issue."

It will be noted that in both the Hetrick and the Peeler
ca.c;es·, Section 8 of the F'ederal Employers' Liability Act,
45 U. S. C. A. Sec. 58, is mentioned as a possible obstacle to
a set off under the provisions of Section 5 of the same Act.
Section 8 reads as follows:
"Nothing in this chapter shall be held to limit
the duty or liability of common carriers or to impair
the rights of their employees under any other Act
or Acts of Congress."
The argument apparently is that since tne right to annuities
or pensions arise under the provision of the Railroad Retirement Act, allowance of a set-off of these annuities under
Section 5 would limit the possible liability of the carrier and
impair rights of the employee under the Railroad Retirement Act. No argument could be more tenuous or illogical.
The rights of the employee or others e;ntitled to benefits or
annuities under the Railroad Retirement Act is not questioned or sought to be impaired by a claim for set-off under
Section 5 of the F'ederal Employers' Liability Act. The
continued receipt of such benefits or annuities by the employee or other person entitled thereto· would in no way be
impair'ed. Any judgment recovered in the negligence action
brought on account of the injury. or death of the employee
would be limited by deduction of an amount equivalent to
the defendant's contribution to the annuities received, but
the continued payment of the annuities themselves to the
person entitled to them would not be interrupted. So also,

:ii
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there would be nothing in such a set-off which in any degree
would lessen the legal duty or liability of the carrier to
respond in damages for its negligent acts. The fact that the
amount of the judgment for damages would be diminished
to the extent of the set-off established would not constitute
a limitation upon the carriers' legal duty.
It is submitted that defendant's right to set-off was
properly stated in its pleading in this case denominated
"Amended Answer," and that Section 5 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act expressly authorizes such a set-off.
For the reasons stated, the several cases involving this
question cited by the plaintiff below, in no way modify the
express authority of this statute. In striking defendant's
plea for set-off, the trial court improperly deprived the
defendant of a right conferred on the carrier by the Federal
Employers' Liability Act.
VH.
THE VERDICT IS EXCESSIVE AND THE TRTAL
COURT
. ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO
ORDER A REDUCTION IN THE AMOUNT OR A NEW
TRIAL.
The trial court instructed the jury that any award of
damages was limited to the pecuniary loss sustained by the
deceased's wife and minor children, that is, the present value
of the sum the deceased would have contributed to his family
from his earnings (R. 84). It is important therefore to
examine the record made at the trial with respect to deceased's earnings and the amount of contributions made to
his family from such earnings. The evidence on the subject
was as follows :
"
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On direct examination, Mrs. Thomas, the wife of the deceased, was asked the following question and made the following answer ( R. 269) .
"Q. Now, while your husband was employed on
the railroad about how much did he bring home a
month, about how much did he make a month, would
you say?
1

"A. Two hundred fifty to two hundred seventyfive, I imagine."
Apparently the answer given was not what counsel expected
or hoped the witness would say and counsel pressed the
point with several additional questions, finally eliciting the
statement that the total earnings of the deceased while he
was working on the railroad were from $300 to $350 per
month (R. 269). Mrs. Thomas then said that on an average
$250 to $275 was spent each month to maintain herself and
deceased's children (R. 270).
But on cross-examination, Mrs. Thomas' testimony
painted an entirely different picture with r~spect to the
amount of deceased's earnings. It was true, she said,' that
the deceased was granted a leave of absence from his railroad employment on October 10, 1946,, that on January 9,
194:7 he was granted a further leave of absence for 60 days.
On May 23, 1947, Thomas was granted another 30 days'
leave of absence, and on June 23, 1947 he wa's granted an
additional 30 days' leave (R. 27'6). On July 23, 1947,
Thomas' leave was further extended to August 22, 1947.
During the year 1947, Thomas had worked for the railroad
about 4 months prior to the accident (R. 277). From January through April, 1947, Thomas received no earnings
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

67

from the railroad at all. In May, 1947, Thomas worked only
a very brief time and his check for that month was $51.80
(R. 277, 278). In June, 1947, Thomas didn't work for the
railroad at all and received no earnings. In July, 1947, his
earnings were only $29.92. During August, 1947, Thomas'
earnings were $2'57.89 (R. 278). In September, 1947,
'!1hoTTI!ls' check from the railroad was $217.58. So that for
the whole year 1947 prior to the accident, Thomas' average
monthly earnings, counting only the months he actually
worked, were $138.77 (R. 279). According to Mrs. Thomas,
during the time that her husband was off on leaves of
absence from the railroad, he did some construction work.
·His earnings from construction work were around $300
per month (R. 282). For two months in 1947, Thomas was
off work and spent his time working on their house at Fruita.
He earned no money from any source during these two
months (R. 283).
With respect to the deductions which should be made
from deceased's earning on account of his own expenses and
maintenance, Mrs. Thomas stated that the deceased's expenses away from home while doing railroad work were
$50 to $7'5 per month, but she never kept any particular
track of it (R. 270). She admitted also that in January,
1947, Thomas was working in the Salt Lake Division and he
wrote a letter to the Superintendent requesting a leave of
absence for 60 to 90 days, for the reason that his residence
was in Fruita, Colorado, and he couldnt make enough above
his expenses in Salt Lake to maintain his home (R. 279, 280).
In addition to his board bill for meals and lodging while
away from home, Thomas paid out a certain amount of
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money each month for his own clothing and for personal
incidental expenses such as tobacco and the like (R. 280281) . When at home, Thomas ate his share of the groceries
(R. 281). The deceased would be home about 4 days and
away from home about 3 days each week in connection with
his work on the railroad (R. 271). According to Brakeman
Schauster, he and Thomas had lived at the some rooming
house at Sunnyside. The board bill at this rooming house
was $65.00 per month. This rate was cheaper than what a
brakeman ordinarily has to pay for his living expenses when
away from home (R. 259). Expenses usually run from $3.00
to $3.50 per day when away from home, or from $90 to $100
per month for only meals and lodging (R. 260).
According to the testimony of ..w. E. Myrick, Trust
Officer of the First Security Trust Co., a person of ordinary
prudence, without special skill, could invest money and expect a yield of between 23/t% to 3,% interest (R. 234).
Plaintiff's Exhibit T, admitted in evidence over defendant's objection, indicates that the present value of a monthly annuity of $200, discounted at 23~%, for a person of the
age and with the expectancy of the deceased, would amount
to a little more than $50,000, the amount of the verdict in
this· case. Since there was no evidence of conscious pain or
suffering upon which any money award could be based,
it is apparent that the jury must have assumed in the
present case that the deceased's net monthly contributions
to his family approximated $200 per month. Such an
assumption is contrary to the evidence given by Mrs. Thomas
upon cross-examination, with respect to the deceased's earnings. It submitted in this connection that Mrs. Thomas
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should be regarded as a party to the action and the court
should consider that_portion of her testimony as true which
bears most strongly against her interest. This principle
is well settled in the law. Fowler v. Pleasant Valley Coal
Co., 16 Utah 348, 52 Pac. 594; Casey v. Northern Pacific Ry.
Co., 60 Mont. 56, 198 Pac. 141.
A tabulation of the evidence as admitted by Mrs.
Thomas, shows that during the year 19·47 the deceased's
earnings from the railroad were as follows :
January through April ..
May
June.·.
July
August
September
October
Total

None
. $ 51.80
....... None
2-9.92
2·57.89
217.58
136.66
. . . . . . . $·6·9'3.85

On the basis of the four months ,.when he actually worked,
Thomas' average monthly earnings would be about $138.77.
Mrs. Thomas also admitted that during 2 months of
1947 Thomas didn't work at all (R. 2831), but said that during the time when deceased was not working for the railroad or was not at home, he did construction work at the
rate of $300 per month. On this basis, and excluding· the
month of October, 1947 when Thomas' accident and death
occurred, his total earnings from all sources would be about
as follows for the nine month period :
January ...
February

None (assumed to be the two months
N ~ne when Thomas did no work)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

70
March
.. $300.00 (construction)
April
300.00 (construction)
May . . . . . . . 51.80(railroad)
June
300.00(construction)
July
29.92 (railroad)
August
257.89 (railroad)
September
2'17 .58 (railroad)
Total ... $1,457.19
The above total earnings of $1,457.19 would represent an
average for the nine month period of $161.91 per month,
before any deductions on account of the deceased's personal
expenses. There is nothing in the record regarding Thomas'
earning for years prior to 19,47, or any indication that his
earnings for prior years were either greater or less than
in 1947.
Thomas' expenses when away from home would amount
to at least $3.00 to $3.50 per day, not including such personal
expenses as clothing, tobacco, and his share of food while
at home. On the average, his railroad work required him to
be away from home about 3 days out of a week, according
to Mrs. Thomas. She estimated also that the deceased's expenses were $~50 to $75 per month. If Thomas' own expenses
were subtracted from the average monthly earning figure
of $161.92 per month, it would leave in round figures about
$100 per month, which he may have contributed to the support of his family. This probably would be a generous estimate of the true fact.
If a verdict were computed on this

~asis

by means of
plaintiff's convenient time table for computation of high
verdicts, Exhibit T, at a discount of 2%, %, the result would
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be a verdict of about $25,000, or about half the amount of
the verdict actually returned. It is clear, therefore, that on
the basis of the testimony adduced at the trial and even on
the basis of plaintiff's own Exhibit T, the verdict returned
by the jury is excessive and unreasonable. Even if some
reasonable amount were added to the verdict on account of
the pecuniary value of the deceased's care and training to
his minor children during their minority, the verdict as
rendered would still be grossly excessive. Moreover, a search
of the case books by defendant's counsel has failed to reveal
a single death case where any court has sustained a verdict
as large as in the present case, where the 'deceased's record
of earnings and contributions to dependents in any degree
were comparable to that shown by the evidence in the case at
bar.
Defendant is not una ware of the rulings of this Court to
the effect it is "slow to interfere with a ruling granting or
refusing a new trial on questions relating to damages."
Chatelain v. Thackeray, 98 Utah 525, 100 P. (2d) 191, 198.
Nevertheless, this Court has said that it is not "powerless
to grant relief if it should indubitably appear that the jurors
erred in their judgment as to the amount of damages."
JY!iller v. Southern Pac. Co., 82 Utah 46, 21 P. (2d) 865,
879. And this Court has affirmed its willingness to correct
injustice if "the record clearly indicates the presence of bias,
prejudice, passion or misunderstanding on the part of the
jury in arriving at its verdict." Allison V. McCarthy, 106
Utah 278, 147 P. (2d) 870, 873. When a verdict is challenged
as excessive in the lower court, the trial judge may (1)
grant a new trial if it appears that the verdict is the result
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of passion or prejudice, or (2) if it appears merely that the
jury "have misjudged the evidence, or may have erred in
their judgment ~especting the amount that should be allowed
* * * the error may be cured by requiring the plaintiff
to remit the excess." Stephens Ranch & Live Stock Co. v.
Union Pac. R. Co., 48 Utah 5e8, 161 Pac. 459, 462. In any.
event, the action of the trial court is subject to review in
this Court for an abuse of discretion. Jensen v. Denver &
R. G. R. Co., 44 Utah 100, 138 Pac. 1185, 1192; Geary v. Cain,
69 Utah 340, 255 Pac. 416, 418.
It is submitted that the verdict returned by· the jury

in the present case indicates that the evidence respecting
damages was completely misunderstood or ignored; that the
amount of the verdict not only indicates that the jury erred
in its judgment, but also that it was arrived at on the basis
of bias and prejudice. Under the circumstances, the trial
court should have reduced the verdict or granted a new trial.
This abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court is
sufficiently flagrant that this Court should rev1ew and cor. rect the injustice~
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the trial court committed serious
errors during the trial of this case. As herein demonstrated,
the court erroneously submitted several issues to the jury
when there was no evidence to support a verdict based upon
such issues; .it erroneously and prejudicially instructed the
jury with respect to several important issues in the case, and
also erred in deciding several matters contrary to law.
Further, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to
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take corrective action with respect to the grossly excessive
verdict returned by the jury.
Under the above circumstances, it is respectfully submitted that this Court should reverse and remand the judgment below, with instructions to grant a new trial.
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL AND MCCARTHY,

Attorneys for Appellant.
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